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Few can doubt, in the wake of Watergate and related scandals, that con-
fidence in government has reached a low ebb. Public confidence and participa-
tion in government are vital to maintenance of the democratic system; and,
therefore, government at all levels must creatively seek to revive the public trust.
A first order of business is to prevent further scandals by controlling the conduct
of elected and appointed public officials. The popular view, of course, is that
politics is inseparably involved with corruption; and, indeed, it may be fair to
ask if public conduct, with all its inherent temptations, can ever be effectively
controlled.
Such a pessimistic conclusion is premature, however; criminological research
suggests that a carefully drawn, effectively enforced statute could have a sub-
stantial positive result. Criminal sanctions attached to such a statute could
significantly deter the white-collar crime of public officials. To be effective,
such sanctions must be applied in conjunction with clearly defined standards of
conduct for public officials in matters which involve the possibility of personal
gain, such as government contracting and outside income.
Comprehensive financial disclosure can provide another important check
on self-dealing by public officials. If the electorate is periodically apprised of
the personal financial interests of legislators and administrators, they at least can
know when public officials act for their own gain. This knowledge in itself is a
deterrent to politicians mindful of their reputations. Further, if such disclosures
are required prior to elections and appointments, the public can carefully
scrutinize the candidates and, at least theoretically, elect officials who are free
from financial ties creating potential conflicts. Financial disclosure provisions
enacted in some states have not cleared constitutional review, however, and
any such requirements must be carefully limited to avoid overly intruding on in-
dividual privacy. An overly enthusiastic statute can inhibit good candidates from
seeking office.
A model act constructed to reflect all of these concerns is included in this
article as Appendix B. Several model constitutional amendments, necessary in
most states to effectuate the objectives of the act, are included as Appendix A.
The article itself explores the theoretical and legal bases of the act in some detail.
Throughout the article, references are made to the statutory sections and con-
* Member of the Oregon Bar; currently Legal Aid Attorney in Yamhill County, Orgeon;
former attorney, United States General Services Administration; LL.M., University of Wiscon-
sin-Madison School of Law, 1975; J.D. Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College
(Portland, Oregon), 1972; B.S., Portland State College, 1965.
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stitutional amendments in the appendixes. They should be consulted as necessary.
Furthermore, many miscellaneous procedural provisions are not examined in the
text, and the statute itself should be read to gather its overall structure.
II. Fundamental Considerations in Developing a Statute for the Control of
Public Corruption
Before examining specific provisions of the model act, it is worthwhile to
consider some of the premises from which the act derived. Why is it necessary to
exercise legislative control over the conduct of public officials? Doesn't the public
franchise provide sufficient check on the activities of the unscrupulous? Perhaps
even prior to these questions are questions about the efficacy of legislative sanc-
tions for white-collar crime. Is it reasonable to expect that a statute can have any
effect on public corruption, and what type sanctions-criminal, civil, or a com-
bination-would best accomplish the objective? Furthermore, what are public
expectations in regard to the effectiveness of the criminal justice system?
A. Criminological Research and Theory
1. Punishment Theories
Various studies of the theoretical basis for punishment of criminals have
reached differing conclusions. Acton notes the existence of some eleven theories
of punishment1 while Middendorff reduces the list to five.2 Sutherland and
Cressey list the three theories of retribution,' deterrence,4 and reformation.5
Grupp recognizes these three" and adds the integrative theory.' Grupp's model
will be used throughout this discussion. It should be noted, however, that each
theory is an ideal which is only approached in reality.'
a. Retribution
The primary purpose of retribution is to vindicate the violated law and to
show that such violations will cause the infliction of a penalty on the offender.'
A societal member's acts are representative of the community unless the acts are
repudiated publicly by the infliction of punishment." Such repudiation helps
unify society against crime;1  it is desirable that the repudiation be orderly and
1 Acton, H. B. Acton, in PUNISHMENT: FOR AND AGAINST 45-46 (H. Hart ed. 1971).
2 Middendorff, Wolf Middendorff, in PUNISHMENT: FOR AND AoAINST 11 (H. Hart ed.
1971).
3 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 326 (8th ed. 1970).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 328.
6 Grupp, Introduction, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 5-9 (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
7 Id. at 9.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Callard, Punishment by the State - Its Motives and Form, 10 BR. J. DELINQ. 36, 37
(1959).
10 Id.
11 Grupp, Work Furlough and Punishment Theory, 8 CUm. 63, 70 (1970).
[Vol. 51:636]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
collective.12 Individuals must not assume this duty.
This vindication by repudiation occurs with the offender's loss of freedom
and with an official state body's acquisition of jurisdiction over the offender and
the exercise of this power." If society's desire for retribution is not satisfied,
public confidence in the criminal justice system may be weakened."4
Retribution is an aspect of the vindication of the criminal law necessary to
endow such laws with greater status than a mere request. 5 Retribution also re-
establishes the authority of the state which was flouted by the offender."
Finally, retribution establishes the limits beyond which state coercion may
not be exerted for reformation or deterrence.'
b. Deterrence
A distinction must be made between the effects of punishment on the
recipient of the punishment and the effects of punishment on societal members
in general. The former is designated "individual prevention" or "special pre-
vention,"'" and the latter is known as "general prevention."' 9 "Individual pre-
vention" or "special prevention" is also known as "specific deterrence,"2 and
"general prevention" is also known as "general deterrence."'" "Special preven-
tion" and "specific deterrence" are also known as "rehabilitation" or "reforma-
tion.""22
, Rehabilitation (specific deterrence) will be discussed in the following sec-
tion, and general deterrence is the topic of this section where it will be designated
as "deterrence." This designation generally will be utilized throughout the
remainder of this article.
The objective of deterrence is to deal with the criminal in a manner which
will deter potential criminals from the commission of crimes.2" Punishment must
not exceed that amount necessary to deter potential criminals.24 In short, any
rational approach to crime prevention cannot ignore the deterrence theory of
punishment.2"
One criticism of the deterrence theory is that the criminal is punished, not
12 Grupp, supra note 6, at 5.
13 Coddington, Problems of Punishment, 46 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOT. SOC'y (n.s.) 155.
160 (1946).
14 Nfiddendorif, supra note 2, at 12.
15 Coddington, supra note 13, at 164.
16 Callard, supra note 9, at 39.
17 Hawkins, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MoD. L. REv. 205, 208 (1944).
18 Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 949,
949 (1966).
19 Id.
20 Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 703, 704 n. 3; Ohiricos & Waldo, Punishment and Crime: An Examination of Some
Empirical Evidence, 18 Soc. PROB. 200, 215 (1970).
21 Chambliss, supra note 20, at 704 n. 3; Ohiricos and Waldo, supra note 20, at 215.
22 Andenaes, supra note 18. at 949.
23 Grupp, supra note 6, at 7
24 Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study in Social Valuation, 61
Am. J. Soc. 247, 247 (1955).
25 Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 H~Av. L. REv. 453, 462 (1928).
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for his act, but for the tendency of others to commit the same act.26 However,
this is one of the unavoidable costs of an adequate system of social control.
Social order would be weakened if, in the determination of the amount of punish-
ment to be inflicted, the deterrence of potential criminals were ignored.
c. Rehabilitation
One authority has stated that individualized treatment of criminals is in-
dispensable in the modem criminal justice system." Another states that "it is uni-
versally agreed that rehabilitation has an important place in any civilized system
of criminal justice."28
The goal of rehabilitation is to treat the criminal in such a manner that he
engages in noncriminal behavior upon his release from state authority." Re-
habilitation depends in part on a deterrent that strongly impresses the criminal,"0
but the offender's self-respect must not be shattered so that he no longer has any
hope of self-improvement." The ideal of rehabilitation is to create in the
criminal new values and a desire to contribute favorably to society's develop-
ment."2
It must be remembered; however, that any substantial and involuntary
deprivation of liberty is always punitive"3 and must be scrutinized closely. 4 But,
as the term implies, individualized treatment of the criminal cannot be based on
a set of detailed rules.'
d. Integrative Theory
The integrative theory maintains that punishment should perform all three
functions of retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 8 The objective is the
integration of the three separate functions.' Society demands that the criminal
be treated in such a manner as to mitigate the desire for retribution.' Society
also expects that the criminal should receive treatment which will deter potential
criminals.' " Finally, it is desirable that after punishment the offender be re-
26 K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 206 (1968); Bittner and Platt, The
Meaning of Punishment, 2 Iss. Cas. 79, 93 (1966).
27 Glueck, supra note 25, at 462.
28 Hall, The Purposes of a System for the Administration of Criminal Justice, in THEORIES
OF PUNISHMENT 395 (S. Grupp ed. 1971).
29 Grupp, supra note 6, at 8; Grupp, supra note 11, at 73-74.
30 Schmideberg, Re-Evaluating the Concepts of "Rehabilitation" and "Punishment,"
12 INT'L J. OFFENDER THER. 25, 25 (1968).
31 Callard, supra note 9, at 42.
32 Meyer, Reflections on Some Theories of Punishment, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 595,
597 '(1968).
33 Delaney, John V. Delaney, in PUNISHMENT: FOR A D AGAINST 113 (H. Hart ed.
1971); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 226, 230 (1959).
34 Allen, supra note 33, at 230.
35 Glueck, supra note 25, at 470.
36 Grupp, supra note 6. at 9; Grupp, Work Release in the United States, 54 J. CRim.
L.C. & P.S. 267, 271 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Release].
37 Grupp, supra note 11, at 75.
38 Grupp, supra note 6, at 9; Grupp, supra note 11, at 75.
39 Grupp, supra note 6, at 9; Grupp, supra note 11, at 75.
[Vol. 51:636]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
assimilated into society.4" In short, none of the theories of punishment can be
excluded if society is to receive full protection as a result of the infliction of
punishment."
Because of its comprehensiveness, the integrative theory will guide the
determination of the appropriate punishment for corruption and conflicts-of-
interest behavior.
2. Corruption and Conflicts of Interest as White-collar Crime
White-collar crime is the violation of criminal law in the course of legitimate
occupational activity by an individual having high socioeconomic status.42
Only behavior punishable by law qualifies,43 but violations of administrative
regulations are included.4 White-collar crime includes crimes committed by
politicians45 in connection with that occupation," and, more specifically, it in-
cludes governmental corruption (the acceptance of bribes)," influence ped-
dling,48 vote selling,49 and conflicts of interest."0
The basic characteristic of all white-collar crime is the violation of trust.5
Consequently, white-collar crime theory and research are relevant to the be-
havioral foundation of a statute controlling corruption and conflicts of interest
behavior.
a. Retribution and Deterrence as Factors in the Control of Corruption and
Conflicts of Interest Behavior
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that "[t]he first requirement of a sound body
of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, whether right or wrong."5 In determining the appropriate punish-
ment for corruption or conflicts of interest, a discussion of the attitudes of both
40 Grupp, supra note 6, at 9; Grupp, supra note 11, at 75.
41 Middendorff, supra note 2, at 11.
42 E. SUTHERLAND, WHIRE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949); Quinney, The Study of White
Collar Crime: Toward a Reorientation in Theory and Research, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
208, 208 '(1964).
43 Quinney, supra note 42, at 210.
44 D. GIBBONS, CHANGING THE LAWBREAKER 111 (1965).
45 Clinard, Sociologists and American Criminology, 41 J. CRiM. L.C. 549, 552 (1951).
46 M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET 227 (1952) [hereinafter cited as M. CLINARD];
Clinard, Research Frontiers in Criminology, 7 BR. J. DELINQ. 110, 116 (1956).
47 M. CLINARD & R. QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 189 (2d ed. 1973); 2 H.
MANNHEIM, COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 495 (1965); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS
IMPACT 104 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION]; W. RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROBLEM
209 (2d ed. 1955); Sutherland and Cressey, supra note 3, at 44; Ross, The Criminaloid, 99
AT. MONTHLY 44, 46-47 (1907).
48 A. MORRIS, CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1st ed. 1934); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 47 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION]; SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, supra note
3, at 44.
49 COMMISSION, supra note 48, at 47.
50 COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 104; Note, Remedies for Conflicts of Interest Among
Public Officials in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 600, 601 (1973).
51 Sutherland, Crime and Business, 217 ANNALS 112, 112 (1941); Sutherland, White-
Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. Rav. 1, 3 '(1940).
52 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
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the public and the regulated class regarding criminal actions and civil proceed-
ings is in order.
Schwartz and Skolnick have studied the effects of legal stigma." They
examined the subsequent effects on a doctor's practice resulting from his being
a defendant in a private, civil malpractice action. 4 No widespread harm to
the doctors' practices was noted,5" and some doctors reported that their medical
income from private practice increased after their involvement in the mal-
practice actions.56 These results occurred even when the doctor lost the mal-
practice action.5
When the party bringing the civil action is the state and not a private party,
different results occur. Hartung's study of the Detroit meat black market" noted
the degree of disapproval of the public and the regulated class toward criminal
and civil actions initiated by the Government for violation of federal price-
control laws. Hartung concluded that the public tends to disapprove equally of
the civil and criminal cases. 9 He suggests that the public fails to make the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal cases made in the law.6" The subject cases
all involved the Government as the plaintiff,6 and it is submitted that this is the
reason for the public's equal disapproval of these civil and criminal cases. In the
study conducted by Schwartz and Skolnick, no stigma resulted from a private
civil action, but the equivalent stigma of a criminal -trial attaches in a civil
action when the Government initiates it. The public apparently attaches
equal stigma to any defendant subjected to any Government-initiated action.
Hartung also concluded that the public and the regulated class tend to dis-
approve equally of the criminal cases" while they differ significantly in their dis-
approval of the civil cases;63 the public consistently disapproves more strongly
than does the regulated class.64 The regulated class was discovered to be
significantly more disapproving of criminal cases than of civil cases.65 Its judg-
ment of the criminal cases is harsh while that regarding the civil cases is rela-
tively mild.6" This indicates that a statute providing criminal penalties will have
a stronger deterrent effect against white-collar crime than one establishing civil
penalties. For maximum deterrence, then, a corruption and conflicts-of-interest
control statute should establish criminal penalties.
Despite the public's equal disapproval of government-initiated civil and
53 Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. PROB. 133 (1962).
54 Id. at 138-39.
55 Id. at 138.
56 Id. at 138-39.
57 Id. at 139, 142.
58 F. Hartung, A Study in Law and Social Differentiation (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan, 1949) [hereinafter cited as Hartung]; Hartung, Common and Discrete
Group Values, 38 J. Soc. Psy. 3 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Values].
59 Hartung, supra note 58, at 330; Values, supra note 58, at 15.
60 Hartung, supra note 58, at 316; Values, supra note 58 at 16.
61 Hartung, supra note 58, at 300; Values, supra note 58, at 9.
62 Hartung, supra note 58, at 316, 331; Values, supra note 58, at 16.
63 Hartung, supra note 58, at 317, 331; Values, supra note 58, at 17.
64 Hartung, supra note 58, at 331.
65 Id. at 317; Values, supra note 58, at 17.
66 Hartung, supra note 58, at 331.
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criminal cases, Gardiner's study of political corruption 7 reveals that an over-
whelming majority of the subjects interviewed favored the criminal prosecution
of officials engaging in corruption.6" An even greater majority favored a fairly
long period of imprisonment as punishment for such misconduct.6 9 Briefly, if a
statute controlling corruption and conflicts of interest is to reflect public desires,
it must establish criminal penalties for its violation.
Punishment as a deterrent is related to the type of act committed and to the
meaning attached to the punishment by the actor."0 Deterrence is likely to oper-
ate against crimes involving rational considerations and intellect." A former
director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons has stated that imprisonment effec-
tively deters the commission of white-collar crime. 2
Clinard's study of the black market" discusses the deterrence of this type of
crime. It should be noted that black market operations reflected unpatriotic
and selfish activity74 similar to that of corruption and conflicts of interest. For
example, gasoline dealers were trustees of a scarce commodity, 5 just as govern-
ment officers and employees are trustees of the public welfare. Thus, participa-
tion in the black market and government corruption and conflicts of interest are
quite similar white-collar crimes. Clinard's conclusions regarding the deter-
rence of black market operations are applicable to the deterrence of corruption
and conflicts of interest.
Government control of rental charges was quite effective. 6 One reason for
this was the complete registration of base-period charges, which allowed more
effective policing of landlords.7 Adequate disclosure allowed effective policing
which deterred violations. Disclosure is a means of deterring corruption and
conflicts of interest and will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent sec-
tion.
78
Imprisonment, even if only of short duration, was the punishment most
feared by businessmen engaging in black market operations.79 In areas where
prison sentences were adequate, regulations were obeyed, but inadequate sen-
tences were associated with violations.8 0 For example, gasoline-rationing viola-
tions, which involved infrequent imprisonment, were extensive. 1 Because of
67 J. GARDINER, THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gardiner];
Gardiner, Wincanton: The Politics of Corruption, in TASx FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME
61 (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Wincanton]; Gardiner, Public Attitudes Toward Gambling and Corruption,
374 ANNALS 123 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Attitudes].
68 Attitudes, supra note 67, at 128.
69 Gardiner, supra note 67, at 50-51; Wincanton, supra note 67, at 76.
70 Chambliss, The Deterrent Influence of Punishment, 12 CRIME & DELINQ. 70, 75 (1966).
71 Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 77 (1966).
72 Bennett, After Sentence-What?, 45 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 537, 537 (1955).
73 M. CLINARD, supra note 46; Clinard, Criminological Theories of Violations of Wartime
Regulations, 11 AM. Soc. Rv. 258 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Theories].
74 See M. CLINARD, supra note 46, at vii, 127, 160.
75 Id. at 176.
76 Id. at 203.
77 Id. at 204.
78 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 195-220 infra.
79 M. CLINARD, supra note 46, at 243-44; Theories, supra note 73, at 263.
80 Theories, supra note 73, at 263 n. 17.
81 M. CLINARD, supra note 46. at 166.
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their reputations,82 businessmen considered imprisonment a more effective deter-
rent than the payment of a fine 8 since the latter could easily be paid from
profits.
8 1
Hartung's study of the Detroit meat black market 5 also concluded that
imprisonment was more feared than a fine or monetary settlement."8
Adverse newspaper publicity regarding enforcement actions also
served as a deterrent.8 7 This is reflective of the white-collar criminals concern
with the preservation of a good reputation.
Another effective deterrent against black market operations was the sus-
pension of the offender's license to sell certain commodities." The removal of an
official or employee from public office or position for engaging in corruption or
conflicts of interest behavior should have the same deterrent effect. This remedy
forms an integral part of the model constitutional amendments and model act.89
One legal study of conflicts of interest in government contracts0 found that
the size of government operations permits the concealment of corrupt practices.9 1
A severe deterrent is recommended.9 2 Another study9" concluded that removal
from office, with the accompanying publicity, is a sufficiently severe penalty to
deter such misconduct.94
In conclusion, available research indicates that corruption and conflicts of
interest may be deterred. Imprisonment satisfies both deterrence and retributive
objectives. Removal from office and the mandatory filing of financial disclosure
statements, discussed in more detail later, 5 also are valuable deterrents.
b. Rehabilitation of Those Engaging in Corruption or Conflicts
of Interest Behavior
Not every criminal needs rehabilitation.98 Those who do should be enrolled
in programs providing special treatment for special types of criminal behavior.9 7
White-collar criminals, in general, do not need reformation or rehabilitation, 8
nor do they need resocialization. 9  Although incarceration, therefore, is not
82 Id. at 244; Theories, supra note 73, at 263, 264.
83 M. CLiNAmD, supra note 46, at 151; Theories, supra note 73, at 263.
84 M. CLiNARD, supra note 46, at 244; Theories, supra note 73, at 264.
85 Hartung, supra note 58.
86 Id. at 215.
87 M. CLINAIW, supra note 46, at 79.
88 Id. at 255
89 Appendix A, Model Constitutional Amendment I, § 3; Model Constitutional Amend-
ment III, §§ 2 & 3; Appendix B, Model Act § 8(c).
90 Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Government Contracts, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1957).
91 Id. at 366.
92 Id.
93 J. Yankovich, Michigan Conflict of Interest LaW¢ in Relation to Local Boards of
Education (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970).
94 Id. at 143.
95 See the discussion in the text near notes 195-220 in!ra.
96 Weinhofen, Punishment and Treatment, in TnE LAw oF CRIMNAL CORRECTioN 667
(S. Rubin, H. Weinhofen, G. Edwards. and S. Rosenzweig eds. 1963).
97 See Gibbons and Garrity, Some Suggestions for the Development of Etiological and
Treatment Theory in Criminology, 38 Soc. FoRcEs 51, 57 '(1959).
98 Middendorif, supra note 2, at 19.
99 D. GmBONS, supra note 44, at 270.
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necessary for purposes of rehabilitation, it has important deterrent effects, 100 and,
as discussed, at least short-term imprisonment should be inflicted for the com-
mission of white-collar crimes.?10 Furthermore, such sentences will help eliminate
the white-collar criminal's noncriminal self-image."0 2
For governmental corruption, the primary purpose of imprisonment is the
deterrence of others from the commission of similar acts.'0 3 Thus, while it is
possible for a criminal to be rehabilitated before beginning to serve any part of
his criminal sentence,' deterrence and retribution may still require that a
prison sentence be served.' This is true for individuals engaging in corruption
and conflicts of interest behavior. They are not in need of rehabilitation, and
they present no danger to society requiring their isolation. But, as discussed pre-
viously,' O0 the public desires a fairly long period of imprisonment as punishment
for such misconduct. Retribution requires incarceration. And deterrent effects,
as noted earlier,0 7 are created by imprisoning such offenders. Thus, retribution
and deterrence considerations require imprisonment for those committing cor-
ruption and conflicts of interest.
The next section discusses work-release programs and the general outlines
of the sentence that should be imposed for official misconduct.
c. Work-Release Programs
A community-based corrections system, including work-release programs,
encourages the inmate to become involved with the community. 8 Whenever
possible, the correctional system should utilize such a program. 9 Those selected
for participation in such programs should be of sufficient stability that no
security problems are created by their participation. 10 Certainly, those convicted
of corruption and conflicts of interest qualify for such programs.
The purpose of furlough from prison under work-release programs is to
allow private employment."' The prisoner is employed outside the prison during
his hours of employment and returns to prison at the end of his workday."
2
His wages go to the program administrator who reallocates them."2
Work-release programs serve the various objectives of punishment. The
deterrence function is served by the stigma of being labelled a criminal." 4 In
addition, the individual is isolated from society during the major portion of each
100 See COMMISSION, supra note 47 at 108.
101 Middendorf, supra note 2, at 32-33.
102 D. GIBBONS, supra note 44, at 272.
103 See Andenaes, supra note 18, at 971-72.
104 Mueller, supra note 71, at 80.
105 Id.
106 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
107 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 71-72, 79-86, 88-89 supra.
108 Comment, The Pros and Cons of Conjugal Visits in Prison Institutions, 9 J. FAM. L.
437, 439 (1970).
109 K. MENNINGER, supra note 26, at 265.
110 Release, supra note 36, at 269.
111 Grupp, supra note 11, at 63.
112 Callanan, Thomas J. Callanan, in PUNISHMENT: FOR AND AGAINST 98 (H. Hart ed.
1971); Release, supra note 36, at 267.
113 Release, supra note 36, at 267.
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day." 5 The offender has a sentence to serve and, therefore, must spend his non-
working time in prison. 16 The deterrence function is served adequately.'
The retributive function is met during nonworking hours, including week-
ends, which the individual must spend in prison."' Such prisoners bear the
stigma of being labelled a criminal. 9 In addition, participation in a work-
release program is more difficult than serving the traditional sentence in that the
prisoner must continually adjust both to confinement and to freedom. 2
The rehabilitative function is served in that the offender maintains his self-
respect through his employment activities. 2' He contributes to society 22 and
maintains a sense of responsibility. 22 The total reformation process is facili-
tated.
24
In brief, work-release programs are an ideal method of implementing the
integrative theory of punishment.'2 5 As stated previously, 2 ' this theory is the
guide for determining the appropriate punishment for corruption and conflicts
of interest.
Individuals convicted of corruption or conflicts of interest should be
sentenced to participation in a modified work-release program. They should be
sentenced to a specified period of imprisonment with release time for the per-
formance of free public service in a governmental agency. Their duties should
approximate as closely as possible those performed during the commission of the
acts for which they were convicted. They must return to prison at the end of
each day of duty, and weekends should be spent in prison.
By contributing to society without payment for such services, any necessary
rehabilitation will be encouraged. Society's desire for retribution will be satisfied
by labelling these offenders as criminals, by requiring them to spend the majority
of their hours in confinement, and by requiring that they reimburse society for
the damage caused by their misconduct in office through the performance of
free public service. Such free service, confinement in prison, and the stigma of
the criminal label will also serve to deter others tempted to engage in such
misconduct. All the functions of the integrative theory are served. The model
act implements this proposal.
2 7
The following section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of resti-
tution in serving the objectives of punishment.
114 Id. at 272.
115 Id.
116 Grupp, supra note 11, at 77.
117 Id.; Release, supra note 36, at 272.
118 Release, supra note 36, at 272.
119 Id.
120 Grupp, supra note 11, at 78.
121 Release, supra note 36, at 271-72.
122 Id. at 272.
123 Grupp, supra note 11, at 77.
124 Id. at 76.
125 Id.; Release, supra note 36, at 271.
126 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.




One researcher has concluded that imprisonment discourages voluntary
restitution since incarceration constitutes a ritual form of restitution.1 28 How-
ever, mandatory restitution may serve both retributive and rehabilitative ob-
jectives.'29 Court-ordered restitution adds an element of punitiveness that helps
confirm the criminal character of the proscribed behavior. 3 ' The offender,
however, may view mandatory restitution as a means of evading criminal
responsibility. 3' To avoid this, the individual convicted of corruption and
conflicts of interest should be required both to participate in the work-release
program described above,3 2 including the provision of free public service which
is also a form of restitution to the public, and to disgorge all proven profits earned
from his illegal conduct. The use of the constructive trust as a means of ac-
complishing mandatory restitution will be discussed later. 3
The next section begins the discussion of factors other than those dictated
by criminal sociology (criminology) which must be considered in drafting a
model act controlling corruption and conflicts of interest.
B. Noncriminological Considerations in the Formulation of a
Statute Controlling Corruption and Conflicts of Interest
Corruption and conflicts of interest involve problems of individual ethics
and the administration of government.'34 Unfortunately, problems of public
interest and ethics are not easily defined with the clarity required for effective
control.3 5
The goal of any regulation of public officials' or employees' conduct is the
promotion of both actual, and the appearance of actual, objectivity and im-
partiality in the conduct of governmental affairsP'3 without disqualifying capable
public servants with needlessly stringent restrictions.37 The public servant should
not be allowed to profit at the public's expense. 3 However, he should not be
128 Eglash, Offenders: Comments on Creative Restitution, 4 J. Soc. TzERAPY 32, 39-40
(1958).
129 Coddington, supra note 13, at 170-71.
130 G. Robin, Employees as Offenders 185 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Robin]; Robin, The Corporate and judicial Disposi-
tion of Employee Thieves, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 685, 700 [hereinafter cited as Thieves].
131 Robin, supra note 130, at 185-86; Thieves, supra note 130, at 701.
132 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 126-127 supra.
133 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 489-502 infra.
134 Note, Conflict-of-Interests of Government Personnel: An Appraisal of the Philadelphia
Situation, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 985, 1020 (1959).
135 Yankovich, supra note 93, at 138.
136 Comment, State Legislative Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis of the Alabama Ethics
Commission Recommendations, 23 ALA. L. REv. 369, 380 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment]; Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 I-A~v. L. Rzv. 1209, 1209 (1963);
[hereinafter cited as Note]; Comment, Legislative Conflicts of Interest-An Analysis of the Penn-
sylvania Legislative Code of Ethics, 19 VILL. L. Rav. 82, 89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Pennsylvania].
137 Note, supra note 136, at 1209; Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 83.
138 Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Rights and Remedies Under an Invalid Con-
tract, 27 Ford L. Rev. 31, 46 (1958).
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required to suffer severe hardship because of excessively complex regulation of
his conduct."' Thus, the optimum level of regulation will protect the public
welfare while allowing reasonable activities of public servants.1 "
Public officials and employees need an ascertainable standard for the evalu-
ation of their conduct; 41 they need standards allowing them to evaluate the
effect of nonofficial conduct upon the performance of official duties. 42 The
primary purpose of statutes regulating the conduct of public servants is the
establishment of such conduct guides."4 Establishing these standards should dis-
courage the dishonest from government service4 while also deterring misconduct
by those already serving the public. 45
Furthermore, for a democracy to survive, the public must have faith in its
elected and appointed public servantS' integrity. 4 Any discovery of corruption
is likely to cause disrespect for all government. 4 Legislation controlling officials'
and employees' misconduct has as its purpose the maintenance of public con-
fidence in the governmental process. 4 The public must be assured of equal
treatment for all.'
49
The basic concept underlying the regulation, by statute, of public servants'
conduct is that since these individuals occupy, positions of public trust, 5 ' fiduciary
principles should govern, their behavior. 5 '
1. Potential Means for Controlling Corruption and Conflicts of Interest
Voter policing and control of public servants' misconduct provides an in-
consistent and unpredictable sanction. 2 No uniform standards are provided
which will permit such persons to determine in advance what is acceptable and
unacceptable conduct.'53 Consequently, some form of regulation supplementing
voter election decisions must be formulated. Voter policing is of importance
when combined with officially enacted standards of behavior.
Legislative codes of conduct and self-policing are also ineffective in combat-
139 Id.
140 Legislative Comment, Conflict of Interests, 70 W. VA. L. Rav. 400, 401 (1968).
141 Kaufmann & Widiss, The California Conflict of Interest Laws, 36 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 186,
206 (1963).
142 Note, The Doctrine of Conflicting Interests Applied to Municipal Officials in New
Jersey, 12 RuTG. L. Rxv. 582, 597 (1958).
143 Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and Remedies, 13 RuTG. L. Rav. 666, 700
(1959); Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Employees, 47 VA. L. REV. 1034,
1059 (1961).
144 Comment, supra note 136, at 403.
145 Rhodes, Enforcement of Legislative Ethics: Conflict Within the Conflict of Interest
Laws, 10 HxAv. J. Los. 373. 376 (1973).
146 Levitt, Municipal Aspects of Conflicts of Interest, 24 FaD. B.J. 366, 371 '(1964).
147 Note, Practical Considerations in the Formulation of a Code of Ethics for Govern-
ment Employees, 52 COLUM. L. Rnv. 113, 115 (1952).
148 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 204.
149 R. Getz, Congressional Conflict of Interest 14 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers
-The State University, 1963).
150 Note, supra note 143, at 1034; Comment, Public Officials: The Constitutional Implica-
tions of Mandatory Public Financial Disclosure Statutes, and a Proposal foi Change, 1971
LAw & Soc. OiwDnR 104, 108.
151 Comment, supra note 150, a't 108.
152 Note, supra note 136, at 1214; Note, Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Legis-
lators, 55 IowA L. Rav. 450, 455 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts].
153 Note, supra note 136, at 1214; Conflicts, supra note 152, at 455.
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ing misconduct.15 Legislatures simply are unable and unwilling to police their
own membership. 55 This is the result of conformance to group standards en-
couraging civility, assistance, and cohesion. 50 Joint legislative committees
have also been ineffective in policing membership conduct.1 5 7 Enforcement of
legislative ethics must occur in a body external to the legislature5 " in order to
avoid the paralysis of the legislature's normative pressures. 5
Finally, enforcement of codes of ethics cannot be placed with department
or agency chiefs. ° To do so creates inequities and lack of uniformity of ap-
plication. 6' Enforcement of governmental ethics must be placed in an inde-
pendent agency of the state." 2
Ambiguous laws often are the cause of high rates of violation. 6 To combat
such ambiguity, those charged with administering the law should have the
authority to issue legally binding interpretations, subject to court review. 6'
Clear standards of official behavior are absolutely necessary. 65 It is im-
portant that the public servant have unambiguous guidance so that borderline
cases of potential misconduct can be quickly settled.'66 Advance knowledge of
acceptable conduct aids in avoiding improper behavior.'6 7
There must exist some independent body from which the public servant
can request an opinion as to whether certain conduct is proper. 6 If approval
is given, his actions should not be voidable at the option of the government.'69
That is, if the advisory opinion is requested in good faith and all material facts
are stated in the request, the opinion should be binding on the government.' 0
Although an opinion may be amended or revoked, it should be binding on the
government as to the requesting party.
17 '
Several writers have advocated the use of an administrative agency as the
mechanism for enforcing a statute controlling misconduct of public servants. 2
One reason offered in support of such a recommendation is that administrative
enforcement provides flexibility in the behavior standard and in its application.
75
154 Conflicts, supra note 152, at 453.
155 Rhodes, supra note 145, at 378-81.
156 Id. at 381-82.
157 Id. at 391-92; Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 123 n. 264.
158 Rhodes, supra note 145, at 396.
159 Id. at 397.
160 Note, Conflicts of Interest: A New Approach, 18 U. FLA. L. Rav. 675, 689 (1966).
161 Id.
162 See Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal for the
Regulation of Municipal Transactions, 38 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rav. 373, 399 (1970).
163 Lane, Why Business Men Violate the Law, 44 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 151, 165 (1953).
164 Id.
165 Yankovich, supra note 93, at 34.
166 Note, supra note 134, at 994.
167 Note, A Conflict-of-Interests Act, 1 HARv. J. Laors. 68, 70 (1964).
168 Note, The Federal Conflicts of Interests Statutes and the Fiduciary Principle, 14 VAND.
L. Rav. 1485, 1507-08 (1961).
169 Id. at 1508.
170 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 402.
171 See id.
172 E.g., Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 401; Philos, The Conflict in Conflicts of
Interest: The Rule of Law-The Role of Ethics, 27 FE-D. B.J. 7, 23 (1967); Rhodes, supra
note 145 at 397; Comment, supra note 136, at 374-75; Note, 167, at 69; Comment, Texas
Public Ethics Legislation: A Proposed Statute, 50 Tax. L. R.v. 931, 958 '(1972) [hereinafter
cited as TEx. L. REv.].
173 Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 H~nv. L. REv. 1273, 1282 (1963).
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As noted above,"7 4 however, one purpose of such a statute is the provision of
advance guidance and warning to the public servant. The attainment of these
goals is seriously impeded by the employment of flexible standards. This totem
pole flexibility largely eliminates any advance warning or deterrent effect.
Another rationale for the use of noncriminal sanctions is that most mis-
conduct of public servants defies objective definition." 5 But by utilizing vague
definitions, advance warning, guidance, and deterrence are nearly eliminated.
Still another objection to the use of criminal sanctions is that enforcement
is after the fact while the administrative approach permits the rendering of
advance advisory opinions when so requested by the public servant.' How-
ever, advance advisory opinions may be rendered by the state attorney general
under a criminal sanctions system.
It is also alleged as a fault of criminal sanctions that it is impossible to define
specifically in advance every misconduct situation that may occur.' But this is
undoubtedly true regardless of the type of sanction used. To the extent that it
is used to justify the formulation of flexible and vague standards, guidance,
advance warning, and deterrence will suffer. Finally, the use of advisory at-
torney general opinions will alleviate this problem somewhat.
Another indictment of criminal sanctions is that juries will acquit defendants
if too severe punishment results from a verdict of guilty.' While this is an
argument for aligning the punishment with the offense, an argument no one
wishes to rebut, it cannot be considered an argument against the use of criminal
sanctions per se.
Criminal sanctions are also criticized as being too harsh for enforcement
against public officials and employees. 9 This overlooks the public's desire for
retribution. The public not only favors criminal prosecution of those public
servants engaging in misconduc' 8 but also approves of a fairly long period of
imprisonment as punishment for such actions.'' In addition, this public desire
for retribution at least indirectly rebuts the argument that a jury would be loath
to convict guilty defendants.
Where the misconduct to be deterred can be explicitly and objectively
defined, the use of criminal statutes is appropriate.8 2 Clearly undesirable and
definable conduct should be included in a criminal statute,8 3 but before the
desired requisite guidance, warning and deterrence can result, all statutes regulat-
ing the conduct of public servants must be explicit. Thus, such misconduct is
appropriately proscribed by criminal statutes. Such a statute must be rigid
174 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 141-145, 165-167 supra.
175 Rhodes, supra note 145, at 384.
176 Id. at 399.
177 Note, State Conflict of Interest Laws: A Panacea for Better Government?, 16 DE PAUL
L. REv. 453, 462 (1967).
178 Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CaIM. L.C. & P.S. 176, 192
(1952).
179 Note, supra note 167, at 69; Note, supra note 134, at 1020.
180 Attitudes, supra note 67, at 128.
181 Gardiner, sufira note 67, at 50-51; Wincanton, supra note 67, at 76.
182 Note, supra note 50, at 600; Note, supra note 136, at 1225; Conflicts, supra note 152,
at 456; Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 89-90.
183 Eisenberg. supra note 143, at 700.
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enough to incorporate societal values (retribution) but flexible enough for
deterrence and rehabilitation.'
Substituting administrative and civil sanctions for criminal sanctions re-
quires caution; 8 ' it should be restricted to situations in which the advantages of
administrative over criminal proceedings are clearly understood by the public."'
This condition does not exist in the area of corruption and conflicts of interest,
for, as noted above," 7 the public desires lengthy incarceration sentences as pun-
ishment for such conduct.
Another problem with the use of the administrative sanction is the tendency
for the work product of administrative agencies to deteriorate gradually. 8
The agency over time becomes "lethargic and indifferent to the public
interest."' 85 When enforcement of criminal statutes is placed under the re-
sponsibility of the elected state attorney general, his responsibility to the voters
prevents the onset of the lethargy characteristic of appointed agency members.
The feasibility of placing enforcement responsibility in the state attorney
general is evidenced by the Iowa Attorney General's creation of a Special
Prosecutions Division to handle cases of governmental misconduct.8 Of course,
the state attorney general must receive sufficient funds to staff his office in ac-
cordance with these additional responsibilities. For example, in the first two
years of existence of the Massachusetts conflicts of interest statute, over three
hundred advisory opinions were issued'5 ' with one hundred opinions being issued
within one month after the effective date of the act.'92
The model act basically employs criminal sanctions enforced by the state
attorney general. This will most effectively aid achievement of the goal of con-
trolling corruption and conflicts of interest. The civil sanctions of the model act
also will be enforced by the state attorney general.
2. Specific Procedural Aspects of the Model Act
The model act, section 4(b), establishes authority and responsibility for its
enforcement in the attorney general's office. In addition to investigatory and
prosecutorial functions, this office also has responsibility for the issuance of
advisory opinions when requested. To provide the requisite guidance and
warning, these opinions must be issued within thirty days of receipt; otherwise,
the conduct is deemed approved. All opinions must be published, with dele-
tions necessary to maintain the anonymity of the requesting party. In proper
situations, the opinions are a defense to any action by the state. When appro-
priate, these functions are performed by a special prosecutor appointed by the
governor.
184 Mueller, supra note 71, at 82.
185 H. MANNHEIM, supra note 47, at 482.
186 Id.
187 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
188 P. DOUGLAS, ETMCS IN GOVERNMENT 29 (1952).
189 Id. at 30.
190 Note, supra note 50, at 601.
191 Compare Buss, The Massachusetts Conflict-of-Interest Statute: An Analysis, 45 B.U.L.
REv. 299, 300 n. 1 (1965) with id. at 386.
192 Id. at 386.
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The attorney general or a special prosecutor must initiate a civil action or
suit or criminal prosecution within ninety days after the receipt of a citizen com-
plaint or publish reasons for not doing so.
Those government officials and employees subject to a statute regulating
their behavior must be assured that any judgment regarding their conduct will
be the product of an impartial and competent body.19 Consequently, for the
trial of the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, treasurer, secretary of
state, any justice of the state's highest appellate court, a state senator, and a
state representative, a special Public Ethics Court is created by Section 4(c) (1)
of the Model Act. The trial judge is the chief justice or an associate justice of the
state's highest appellate court appointed by the chief justice of that court or by
the most senior associate justice not disqualified from making such an appoint-
ment if the chief justice is so disqualified. This will provide a dignity and prestige
to the trials of such high-ranking government officials.
The trials Of all other elected and appointed officials and employees will
occur in the highest trial court of record having jurisdiction of the geographic
area in which the alleged misconduct was committed. The chief judge of the
court or one of the judges of the court designated either by the chief judge or by
the most senior judge of the court not disqualified from making such a designa-
tion, if the chief judge is so disqualified, conducts these trials.
Appeals of all verdicts and rulings proceed directly to the state's highest
appellate court. Any judge or justice who conducted the trial is ineligible for
participation in the appellate decision. He must be replaced by the most senior
chief judge of all the state's highest trial courts of record who was not involved
in the conduct of the trial.
To avoid the institution of "political trials," § 5 of the model act waives
sovereign immunity for malicious and unfounded actions initiated by the attorney
general or a special prosecutor. Recovery of actual damages is the remedy.
Model Constitutional Amendment I eliminates any incumbent's potential
immunity from a civil action or suit or criminal prosecution for official mis-
conduct or immunity from a civil action for the refusal to file a required financial
disclosure statement. Final criminal conviction, final imposition of a constructive
trust on illegal profits, or a final decree voiding a government contract or transac-
tion because of official misconduct results in automatic removal from any public
office or position held.
An amendment also is drafted, Model Constitutional Amendment III,
which eliminates the separation of powers doctrine that only the legislature can
remove one of its members from office."' 4 No longer is impeachment the sole
means of removing certain officers.
Finally, constitutional amendment II provides that the state senate refuse
confirmation of any appointee who refuses to file a required financial disclosure
statement. Appointments not requiring senate confirmation are automatically
193 Moneypenny, A Code of Ethics for Public Administration, 21 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 423,
433 (1953).
194 This doctrine is discussed in Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 696. Also, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cL. 1 and cl. 2 for an example of such a restriction.
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withdrawn upon such refusal. The attorney general, or the governor, is required
to disqualify a candidate for elective office who refuses to file a required financial
disclosure statement.
III. Financial Disclosure as a Means of Combatting Corruption
and Conflicts of Interest
Disclosure of financial interests offers an important practical method of
deterring misconduct of public servants.195 It provides a feasible alternative to
overdetailed regulation of official misconduct. 6 Some writers view disclosure
as a prerequisite to the effective enforcement of statutes regulating such con-
duct,197 while others have deemed it the antibiotic remedy for official mis-
conduct. 98 In short, publicity is considered "the most effective safeguard against
the misconduct of public officials."' 99 Honest disclosure is also a weapon against
irresponsible charges by political opponents, " a feature operating to the
political advantage of the honest public servant and against the unscrupulous.
The primary antidote for official misconduct is an informed public interest
in government."0 ' Financial disclosure seeks the collection of relevant informa-
tion which will allow the public to decide what is proper conduct; 2 the public
is thus enabled to make informed judgments about the public servant's fitness to
hold office.2 0' A by-product is the promotion of public confidence in those hold-
ing public office.'0 " Moreover, financial disclosure permits the public servant's
colleagues to evaluate any of the discloser's decisions or recommendations on the
basis of potential or actual pecuniary motivation.'
Financial disclosure forces the official or employee to determine the effects
of his interests and to accept responsibility for his actions." 6 Disclosure results in
the exercise of caution to avoid apparent improprieties in transactions in which
he has an interest.'0 7 Since most public servants value their reputations highly,'0 8
they readily appreciate the potential stigma resulting from any conduct pecuni-
arily favorable to them which cannot be supported by clear reasoning.0 9 Thus,
financial disclosure deters deceit and forces the public servant to consider in
advance the implications of his conduct;" 0 and, additionally, financial disclosure
195 Getz, supra note 149, at 14-15.
196 TExAs, supra note 172, at 933-34.
197 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 389, 406; Note, supra note 177, at 461; Legis-
lative Comment, supra note 140, at 403.
198 G. GRAHAM, MORMATY IN AMERICAN PoLirrcs 245 (1952).
199 Comment, Conflict of Interest in Public Contracts in California, 44 CALIF. L. REv.
355, 373 (1956).
200 Getz, supra note 149, at 272, 273.
201 Douglas, Honesty in Government, 4 ORLA. L. Rv. 279, 280 (1951).
202 Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 688.
203 TExAs, supra note 172, at 934, 938 n.36.
204 Note, The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act - A Step Ahead Toward Better Govern-
ment, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 302, 308 (1972).
205 Rhodes, supra note 145, at 388; Note, supra note 134, at 1022.
206 Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 688.
207 Note, The Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 345,
357 n.68 (1974).
208 P. DOUGLAS, supra note 188, at 98.
209 Note, supra note 134, at 1022.
210 Rhodes. supra note 145, at 388.
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makes financial misconduct easier to detect."'1
In summary, disclosure creates informative, group pressure, and enforce-
ment effects.212 The informative effect permits the recipient of disclosure (the
public and colleagues) to act in accordance with all the facts.213 The group
pressure effect allows the recipient to formulate conduct norms for the dis-
closer, 14 who will avoid engaging in potentially embarrassing conduct. Finally,
complete and accurate disclosure facilitates enforcement of statutes regulating
conduct by aiding in the detection of violations.2 15
One commentator views financial disclosure as a means of promoting gov-
ernmental efficiency and economy.1 Certainly this is a by-product of the
elimination of self-serving behavior by the public servant.
The benefits of financial disclosure, though, are seriously weakened when
the public servant or his supervisor controls disclosure or are the only parties
receiving the disclosed information. 1 Disclosure must be made to a body in-
dependent of the one in which the public servant is an incumbent.1 '
Finally, a disclosure statute should prohibit the filing of false statements;29
indeed, maximum deterrence would require that such an act be considered a
felony. In addition, disclosure statements should be filed annually and be open
to public inspection.22
A. State Court Cases Delimiting Constitutional Financial Disclosure
Requirements
1. The Right of Privacy: City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young
In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young,2 2" ' the California supreme court
held California's financial disclosure law.22 unconstitutional as an overbroad in-
trusion into the right of privacy and an invalid restriction on the right to seek or
hold public office.
The court recognized that the public's right to know of matters which
might cause a conflict of interest between the public duties and private financial
interests of public servants is a proper governmental concern.223 Even though the
governmental purpose is valid, however, means stifling fundamental liberties
cannot be used to achieve the purpose if it can be achieved by the use of a more
narrowly restricted approach. The court reaffirmed the citizen's right to hold
public office and determined that the protection against mandatory public dis-
211 Comment, supra note 150, at 113.
212 Note, supra note 173, at 1292.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1293.
215 Id.
216 Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and Public Employees in Light of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 534, 534 n.5 (1971).
217 Comment, supra note 150, at 125.
218 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 408.
219 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 128.
220 Id.
221 2 Cal. 3d 259. 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
222 Ch. 1512, § 1 [1969] Cal. Stats. 3093-95 (repealed 1973).
223 2 Cal. 3d 262, 466 P.2d at 226-27, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
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closure of one's personal financial affairs, including those of one's spouse and
children, is within the zone of privacy protected by the fourth amendment. 24
Furthermore, this protection was held to be within the penumbra of fundamental
rights into which the government may not intrude without a showing of com-
pelling need coupled with the use of means not overly broad.2 5
Consequently, the government's need to minimize possible conflicts of in-
terest was balanced with the individual's right to privacy in his personal financial
affairs while seeking or occupying a public office. The court noted that the
California statute's coverage applied to those holding office in a state agency
regardless of the nature and scope of the agency's duties, as well as to local
office holders.226 As a consequence, the court concluded that the compulsory
disclosure was not related to financial affairs or assets which reasonably could
be expected to create a conflict of interest. That is, the disclosure was not
related to those assets or financial affairs having a rational connection with the
functions or jurisdiction of a specific agency or with the functions or jurisdiction
of a public officer or employee. Asset values exceeding $10,000 had to be dis-
closed regardless of the asset's location or nature or whether it had any rela-
tion to the discloser's duties or whether the discloser controlled it.2 27 Thus, the
statute was found to be unconstitutionally overbroad,2 while the invasion of
privacy and the chilling effect on the seeking or holding of any public office were
deemed "too clear for dispute."
29
The court noted that requiring relevant disclosures of investments and
assets would be rationally related to the valid purpose of preventing conflicts
of interest by public servants. Such purpose, however, could be accomplished
by a statute drafted more narrowly than the one at issue.2" The court noted
further that the statute's mandatory requirement that all investments exceeding
$10,000 be disclosed may be relevant for members of the legislature and some
public officials and employees.2 "' The essential point is that the legislature is not
precluded from enacting a statute requiring "broad disclosure of assets, income
or receipts relevant to the duties and functions of a public officer or employee. ' 2 2
The instant statute was unconstitutional, however, because no overriding neces-
sity was established which justified the intrusion into relevant and irrelevant
financial affairs of public officials and employees subject to the statute. By not
limiting disclosure only to investments or assets which might be affected by the
duties or functions of a public office, the statute exceeded legitimate state interest,
and caused an unnecessary chilling effect on the individual's willingness to seek
or hold public office.2"3
Justice Mosk, in dissent, stated that the fourth amendment's protection
224 Id. at 268, 466 P.2d at 231-32, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
225 Id., 466 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
226 Id. at 269, 466 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
227 Id., 466 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
228 Id. at 270, 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
229 Id., 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
230 Id., 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
231 Id. at 272, 466 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
232 Id., 466 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
233 Id., 466 P.2d at 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures is irrelevant to the disclosure of
financial interests.2"4 He found no violation of any first amendment rights by
the statute at issue, and stated his belief that the provision of public knowledge
of significant economic factors which may influence an official's decisions out-
weighs the officer's economic privacy. Finally, the Mosk dissent implicitly ac-
cepted the relevant (related) -to-duties test of the majority opinion but held that
it is *doubtful that any investments over the statute's $10,000 disclosure threshold
are irrelevant to the motivations of a public servant. 35
Carmel has been the subject of several criticisms. One writer argued that the
Carmel court relied on a fourth amendment generic right of privacy which is
nonexistent."' Fourth amendment personal privacy issues arise only in the con-
text of an unreasonable search and seizure, which is not the context of Carmel.
The same writer criticizes the Carmel court's use of the penumbral rights
theory to elevate private economic interests to a fundamental rights status
abandoned by the Supreme Court.2" This critic correctly explains that the
Supreme Court requires only that legislation affecting economic interests ra-
tionally relate to a valid state purpose. He maintains that the penumbral rights
approach to the regulation of economic interests should face the same test.23 8
The Carmel majority, however, was concerned with protecting the privacy of
financial affairs and not with economic freedom or interests per se.
Carmel's balancing process was also criticized. Carmel might have reached
a different conclusion if the proper competing interests had been examined.
29
The competing interests that should be balanced are the public servants right to
personal privacy in his financial affairs and the public's right to informed self-
government. It would appear, however; that the Carmel court's recognition of
the public's right to know of matters which might cause a conflict of interest"'
and of the prevention of conflicts of interest as a valid state purpose 4" includes
the public's right to informed self-government. Another critic states that Carmel
failed to recognize the public's right to know.4 2 It is submitted that both
criticisms are based on misinterpretations of Carmel.
The most telling criticism is that the Carmel court failed to consider in its
balancing process the statute's assertion that full disclosure of a public servant's




It is submitted that, had both this interest and that of the public regarding in-
formed self-government, discussed in the preceding paragraph, been balanced
against the right to personal financial privacy, the statute would have been
upheld.
234 Id. at 278, 466 P.2d at 239, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
235 Id. at 284, 466 P.2d at 243, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
236 Comment, supra note 216, at 539.
237 Id. at 539.
238 Id. at 546.
239 Id. at 549.
240 2 Cal. 3d at 262, 466 P.2d at 226-27. 85 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
241 Id. at 270, 466 P.2d at 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 9. Both elements also are recognized in
the court's statement that it must balance the state's. need to expose or minimize possible
conflicts of interest with the public servant's privacy rights. Id. at 269, 466 P.2d at 232,
85 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
242 Note, supra note 207, at 354.
243 49 TzxAs L. Rzv. 346, 353 (1971) [hereinafter cited as TExAs].
[Vol. 51:636]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
2. Cases Upholding Financial Disclosure
In 1973, the California legislature enacted a more limited conflicts of
interest statute,"' the constitutionality of which was tested in County of Nevada
v. MacMillen245 and upheld. The court affirmed the continuing validity of
Carmel but concluded that the new statute satisfied the Carmel standards. 46
The MacMillen court decided that neither the right of privacy nor the right
to seek and hold public office must always override the public's right "to an
honest and impartial government."2 7  The public's interest in maintaining
honest and impartial government is paramount to the interests of an official's
spouse and dependent children in the maintenance of complete financial pri-
vacy.' In addition, MacMillen held that requiring financial disclosure only by
certain high-ranking public officials and employees does not violate the equal
protection clause. 9
In another relevant financial disclosure case, Stein v. Howlett,"' Illinois'
financial disclosure provisions. were held to be constitutional. The Illinois
supreme court found that the disclosure provisions were intended to prevent
conflicts of interest, to reveal any abuse of office, and to instill public trust in
government. 2 The court acknowledged that disclosure of matters truly un-
related to any state activity does not facilitate achievement of the statute's pur-
pose but held that it is proper to require disclosure of "sources of substantial
amounts of income and of significant business interests."25 The purpose of this
statute necessitates broad coverage and, thus, reflects the compelling state interest
which outweighs the rights of the individual public servant; the statute is not
overbroad, therefore, nor an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
25" 4
It should be noted that the Illinois constitution expressly establishes a
right of privacy55 which is not found in the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution, relied on in part by the Carmel court. The Stein court did
not expressly hold that the right of privacy guaranteed by the Illinois constitu-
tion included privacy in financial matters but held that the statute's purpose of
instilling public trust in government and the purposes of preventing conflicts
of interest and revealing abuses of office constituted a sufficient state interest
that is paramount to the individual's right of financial privacy.5 6
The Stein court distinguished Carmel by noting that the California court
objected to the statutory requirement of identical financial disclosure for all
officials, whether state or local, while the Illinois statute applies stricter dis-
244 C~AL. Gowv. CoDn §§ 3600-3760 (West Supp. 1974).
245 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 '(1974).
246 Id. at 666-68, 671-72, 676-77 n.10, 522 P.2d at 1346-47, 1350, 1353 n.10, 114 Cal.
Rptr. at 346-47, 350, 353 n.10.
247 Id. at 672-73, 522 P.2d at 1351, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
248 Id. at 676-77 n.10, 522 P.2d at 1353 n.10, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.10.
249 Id. at 678, 522 P.2d at 1354, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
250 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
251 ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 127, §§ 604A-101 to 604A-102 (Supp. 1974).
252 52 Ill. 2d at 578, 289 N.E.2d. at 413.
253 Id. at 578, 289 N.E.2d at 413.
254 Id., 289 N.E.2d at 413.
255 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
256 52 Ill.2d at 578, 289 N.E.2d at 413.
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closure requirements to state officials than to local officials. 57 Thus, the Illinois
statute has a greater potential for passing the Carmel relevant (related)-to-duties
test than did the original California statute.
Another distinction, not noted by the Stein court, is that the Illinois statute
requires disclosure only of the identity of assets and sources of income258 while the
California statute required disclosure of the nature and extent of any investments
exceeding $10,000 in value."' Of course, the comparative extent of any privacy
intrusion in a particular case would depend upon such factors as the value of
each investment and the total number of investments held.
Despite such statutory differences, the crucial distinction between Carmel
and Stein is that the latter recognizes the public's right to know, the fostering of
public confidence in government, and the prevention of conflicts of interest as
a compelling state interest overriding the public servant's right of privacy in
financial affairs. As noted previously,"' Carmel, on the other hand, did not
consider the necessity of cultivating public confidence in government, the public's
right to know, or the prevention of conflicts of interest as a compelling state
interest overriding the public servant's right of privacy in his financial affairs. 61
The Illinois supreme court in Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker"2
further developed the principles announced in Stein. Walker upheld the con-
stitutionality of a governor's executive order requiring the filing of detailed
financial disclosure statements (including the monetary amounts of all assets,
liabilities, and income sources) by certain state employees. The right of privacy
guaranteed by the Illinois constitution.. did not restrict the disclosure by state
officers and employees of economic interests since the state constitution5 4 also
authorizes economic disclosures." 5 The court concluded that the state's com-
pelling need for efficient, ethical government is paramount to the employee's
fundamental right of privacy." 5 Complete financial disclosure is substantially
related to the valid state concern and, therefore, is not an overly broad require-
ment. Finally, the court held that because of the danger of indirect conflicts of
interest and the possibility of influencing an employee through gifts to a spouse,
the provision of the executive order relating to the disclosure of interests of
spouses and immediate family members is not limited to those interests con-
structively controlled by the employee nor to those interests deemed by the
employee to be related to his or her public employment.'
The primary significance of Walker is its holding that requiring detailed
financial disclosures (including monetary amounts) is not unconstitutionally
overbroad because such disclosures are substantially related to the state's com-
257 Id. at 579, 289 N.E.2d at 414.
258 ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 127, § 604A-102 (Supp. 1974).
259 Ch. 1512, § 1 [1969] Cal. Stats. 3095 (repealed 1973).
260 See the discussion in the text accompanying note 243 supra.
261 Compare 2 Cal. 3d at 262, 466 P.2d at 226-27, 85 Gal. Rptr. at 3 with id. at 272, 466
P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
262 57 IIl. 2d 512. 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974).
263 ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
264 ILL. CONST. art. 13, § 2.
265 57 III. 2d at 524, 315 N.E.2d at 15.
266 Id. at 526, 315 N.E.2d at 17.
267 Id. at 527-28, 315 N.E.2d at 17.
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pelling interest in efficient and ethical government.
Some of the Stein-Walker holdings are contradicted in Lehrhaupt v.
Flynn. 8 New Jersey township officials challenged the constitutionality of a
financial disclosure ordinance. The court held, inter alia, that instilling trust of
government officials in the public is not a valid governmental interest. 8
Lehrhaupt also held that requiring disclosure of financial interests of spouses and
minor children, unless constructively controlled by the reporting official, is un-
constitutional.7 0
Another recent state case relevant to the constitutionality of financial dis-
closure laws is Fritz v. Gorton."' In this case the Washington state supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of the Washington disclosure statute.272 This
statute requires the filing of a financial disclosure statement by all elected officials
and candidates with the exception of incumbents in the offices of president, vice
president, and precinct committeeman and candidates for these offices. Dis-
closure statements are required of other public officials and public employees by
a statute2'" not at issue in this case.
As background for its opinion, the Fritz court noted that an informed and
active electorate is vital to the existence of a democracy and recognized the cur-
rent increase in distrust of public officials and governmentY.27  Proceeding to the
disclosure portion of its opinion, the Washington court stated that, ideally,
financial disclosure legislation should not totally ignore the right of privacy of
those subject to the disclosure statute.275 There should be an optimum balance
between the rights of those subject to the disclosure statute and the right of the
public to know or be informed about those who represent them in government.
The court recognized, however, that the right of privacy is not absolute.
There are inherent limitations on this right when the protected individual is a
candidate or incumbent public official; information which directly relates to the
qualifications and fitness of those seeking or holding public office is in the public
217domainY.
The majority noted that freedom of the press has been construed so as to
encourage and protect public discussion of the conduct of public officials, and the
right to receive information is fundamental to the right of free speech.27 This
right of the public to know is not less fundamental than the right of privacy.
2 79
The privacy rights of the candidate or officeholder are not paramount to the
public's right to be informed of matters related to one's fitness to hold public
office. The court decided that the terms of the statute were not irrationally un-
related to the legitimate purposes to be served by the legislation, and, therefore,
268 129 N.J. Super. 327, 323 A.2d 537 (Ch. Div. 1974).
269 Id. at 333, 323 A.2d at 540.
270 Id. at 334-35, 323 A.2d at 541.
271 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
272 WAsH. REv. CoDm Aim. tit. 42, § 17.240 (Supp. 1974).
273 WASH. REv. CODa ANN. tit. 42, § 21.060 (1972).
274 83 Wash. 2d at 283-84, 517 P.2d at 917.
275 Id. at 293-94, 517 P.2d at 922.
276 Id., at 294, 517 P.2d at 923.
277 Id. at 294-95, 517 P.2d at 923.
278 Id. at 296, 517 P.2d at 924.
279 Id. at 298, 517 P.2d at 925.
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are not overbroad.28
In analyzing the overbreadth issue, the court interpreted the statute as not
requiring detailed itemization in specific dollar amounts but only the identifica-
tion of assets and relationships fitting within broad monetary categories;2"" other
aspects of the statute will be discussed later.2 2 The court recognized, however,
that the disclosure statute may require disclosures not clearly related to a par-
ticular public office and concluded that it would be impossible to tailor required
disclosures to each existing public office. The statute, therefore, was not un-
constitutionally overbroad."'
3. General Principles of the State Court Decisions
Some general principles can be discerned from a comparative analysis of
these decisions. Carmel and Fritz both balanced the public's right to know
against the public servant's right to financial privacy, with the Carmel court
adding the government interest in preventing official misconduct. The Carmel
scales found the privacy interests to be overriding while Fritz found the public's
right to know to be overriding. The Carmel test of overbreadth depends on
whether disclosures are unrelated or irrelevant to duties. The Fritz court recog-
nizes the impossibility of tailoring disclosure requirements to each public post
and instead asks whether the required disclosures are irrationally unrelated to the
statute's legitimate purposes. In short, Carmel and Fritz assign different weights
in their respective balancing of the same interests (with Carmel adding the
government interest in preventing official misconduct) and employ different
tests of overbreadth.
It is submitted that the statutory differences of Carmel and Fritz do not
affect the above conclusions. The California statute required that every public
official and employee disclose the nature and extent of each investment or
financial interest owned or constructively owned which exceeded $10,000 in
value284 Certainly this requirement would intrude on the financial privacy of
only the wealthier officials and employees, and even they could avoid this in-
trusion by owning many investments and interests, each having a value of less
than $10,000. The potential for invasions of privacy is much greater under
the Washington statute since it requires disclosure of the identity and values of in-
vestments, financial interests, debts, the identity of persons for whom legislative
or rate matters were advocated for compensation, and the identity of em-
ployers2 5 Disclosure thresholds range from total disclosure to a threshold of
$5,000.8' Thus, although the Washington statute constitutes a greater invasion
of privacy than did the California statute, the Fritz court did not give overriding
weight to the privacy interest 'while the Carmel court did.
280 Id. at 300, 517 P.2d at 926.
281 Id. at 299, 517 P.2d at 925.
282 See the discussion in the text accompanying. notes 285-86 infra.
283 83 Wash. 2d at 300, 517 P.2d at 926.
284 Ch. 1512, § 1 [1969] Cal. Stats. 3094-95 (repealed 1973).




Additional support for the different weights view is the fact that each
statute applies indiscriminately to all members of the regulated class. The
California statute applied to all public servants, whether of high or low power
and jurisdiction, and the Washington statute applies to all elected officials and.
candidates, whether of high or low authority. But the California act was deemed
to unconstitutionally invade the right of privacy while the Washington statute
does not. The different results are best explained by the different weights
assigned by the respective courts to the interests involved.
It may be argued that the Fritz assignment of a lower weight to the privacy
interest than to the public's right to know is limited to a statute, such as Wash-
ington's, in which only the conduct of elected officials is regulated. That is, the
privacy rights of elected officials and candidates are subordinate to the public's
right to know of matters relevant to the conduct of such individuals, but privacy
rights of appointed public servants outweigh the public's right to know.
Carmel, however, did not intimate that the California statute was overbroad
only as to all appointed public servants and constitutional as to all elected
officials. Rather, the public's right to know and the state interest in preventing
official misconduct increased while the right to privacy decreased as the author-
ity and responsibility of the individual increased, regardless of whether he was
appointed or elected. Fritz applied the same right of privacy and right to know
standard to all elected officials and candidates, regardless of increasing or de-
creasing authority and responsibility, once again indicating that different
weights were assigned by the respective courts to the interests involved.
The significance of MacMillen is its recognition that the public servant's
right of privacy and the right to seek and hold public office do not always over-
ride the public's interest in honest and impartial government. Important also is
the holding that limiting financial disclosure to certain high-ranking public
servants does not violate the equal protection clause.
Stein includes in the balancing process the state interest in fostering public
confidence in government. This interest plus the public's right to know and the
government interest in the prevention of conflicts of interest outweigh the public
servant's right of financial privacy. The significance of Stein is that it recognizes
the importance of this state interest in cultivating public confidence in the in-
tegrity of government. It is submitted that Lehrhaupt's holding that such an
objective does not constitute a valid governmental concern is not the better view.
It is arguable, of course, that since the Illinois statute requires fuller dis-
closure for high-ranking public officials than for those of lower rank, Stein is
really in accord with Carmel as to the applicable law. Both apply a relevant
(related) -to-duties test of overbreadth. However, the Stein court only mentioned
the statutory differences in passing. The heart of its decision is the inclusion in
the balancing process of the state's interests in fostering public confidence in gov-
ernment, preventing conflicts of interest, and facilitating the public's right to
know. These interests, when balanced against privacy rights, override the latter.
Carmel found the privacy right to be overriding but neglected to include in the
balancing process the state interest in fostering public confidence in government.
Walker's importance is its holding that the state's compelling need for
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efficient, ethical government is paramount to the employee's fundamental right
of privacy. Even detailed financial disclosure in monetary amounts is sub-
stantially related to the valid state concern and, therefore, is not overbroad.
An important distinction involves the Walker-Lehrhaupt disagreement re-
garding the constructive control of assets of spouses and minor children. The
Lehrhaupt requirement of constructive control is founded on the existence of
certain legal impediments to the reporting official's ability to obtain information
from spouses and minor children.2 7 It is submitted that a statute requiring a
public official to report the assets of spouses and minor children creates a duty on
spouses and minor children to provide the required information to the reporting
official regardless of the existence of obstacles to such disclosures when the
recipient is not a reporting public official. In short, to more effectively control
corruption and conflicts of interest, the Walker requirement that all interests
of spouses and minor children be disclosed by the reporting official should be
followed as closely as possible.
The better views are those expressed in Stein, Walker, Fritz and MacMillen;
they are incorporated in the model act. The public's right to know and the
government interest in both the prevention of official misconduct and the culti-
vation of public confidence in the integrity of government outweigh the public
servant's interest in financial privacy so long as the disclosure statute is not over-
broad in its reach. Since it is impossible to match disclosure requirements to
each existing public post, the proper test of overbreadth is whether the dis-
closure requirements are irrationally unrelated to the valid purpose of the dis-
closure statute. The model act applies the principle that the disclosure of the
mere existence of a possible conflict of interest should be sufficient to alert the
public to seek an explanation.""
B. The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-incrimination as a Check on
Financial Disclosure
1. Cases Involving Statutes Compelling Incriminating Evidence
The decision providing much of the background for the discussion in this
section and the preceding one is Shelton v. Tucker."9 Shelton considered the
constitutionality of an Arkansas statute which required, as a condition of em-
ployment for a teacher in a public school or college, the annual filing of an
affidavit listing every organization to which the affiant had belonged or regularly
contributed during the preceding five years.8 ' The Court noted that a state has
the right to investigate the competence and fitness of its teachers;29 ' yet, even
though the government's purpose is valid and substantial, means cannot be used
to achieve it which broadly stifle fundamental liberties if the end can be achieved
287 129 N.J. Super. at 334, 323 A.2d at 540-41.
288 TaxAs, supra note 243, at 355.
289 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
290 Id. at 480.
291 Id. at 485.
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by less stifling means."2 The Court ultimately held that the statute's interfer-
ence with the right of association exceeded the state's interest in investigating
the fitness and competence of its teachers.293 The relevant portion of the opinion,
for purposes of this discussion, is the limitation on the infringement of funda-
mental rights by an overbroad statute enacted pursuant to a valid state concern.
The same theory was applied in Marchetti v. United States.9 4 in which the
Court began the development of a line of self-incrimination cases relevant to
financial disclosure requirements. Petitioner, engaged in the business of gam-
bling, was convicted of failing to register his business and pay a federal occupa-
tional tax. The Court noted that, as a group, those engaged in wagering are
inherently suspected of criminal conduct. Further, the information required by
the federal wagering tax laws was made available to assist authorities in the en-
forcement of statutes proscribing gambling. "5 The Court held that the privilege
against self-incrimination is not waived merely because an inherently suspect
group has been ordered either to cease engaging in activities requiring registra-
tion or to provide incriminating evidence by registering and have elected to do
neither. " 6 Nor is the privilege against self-incrimination diminished because
disclosure of an illegal purpose precedes the illegal act, such as requiring a party
to register and post a wagering tax stamp before being allowed to conduct an
illegal gambling business. The privilege is not concerned with a chronological
formula but with "the substantiality of the risks of incrimination."2 7 Here, a
party could reasonably fear that registration and acquisition of a wagering tax
stamp would constitute decisive evidence of a violation of state gambling
statutes.
298
The Court held that the Shapiro v. United States29" required records excep-
tion was inapplicable to the privilege against self-incrimination. Shapiro was
distinguished in three ways: (1) the statute at issue did not require the mainte-
nance of records ordinarily kept but required the provision of information un-
related to business records; (2) the information demanded had no public
aspects, for this status is not created merely because the Government desires in-
formation; and (3) the requirements of the instant statute did not involve a
noncriminal, regulatory area but were directed at a group inherently suspected
of engaging in criminal conduct."'
Although the Court reaffirmed the power of Congress to tax illegal activ-
ities.01 and did not find the wagering tax unconstitutional,30 2 it held that those
who properly assert the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be punished
criminally for failure to comply with the statute.0 Congress may tax illegal
292 Id. at 488.
293 Id. at 490.
294 390 U.S. at 39 (1968).
295 Id. at 47.
296 Id. at 52.
297 Id. at 54.
298 Id.
299 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
300 390 U.S. at 57.
301 Id. at 58.
302 Id. at 61.
303 Id.
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activities but in ,s doing cannot require the provision of self-incriminating in-
formation or establish a procedure whereby payment of the tax constitutes con-
clusive evidence of engaging in illegal conduct. A statute may not require the
performance of an act when such performance constitutes evidence of criminal
conduct.
In Grosso v. United States,"0 4 the Supreme Court exended the protection
for the right against self-incrimination established in Marchetti. Petitioner was
convicted of willful failure to pay a federal wagering excise tax, of willful failure
to pay a federal occupational tax, and of conspiracy to defraud the United States
by evading payment of both taxes."'5 The Court noted that the wagering tax
return is designed for use only by those engaged in the gambling business. Its
submission and the responses to the questions asked directly for evidence of the
taxpayer's gambling activities; and if the return does not accompany the tax
due, the payment is not accepted."'
The Court concluded that those liable for payment of the excise tax could
reasonably believe that information obtainable from its payment or the submis-
sion of the required form would be provided to federal and state prosecutors.
Therefore, the hazards of incrimination resulting from the obligation to pay the
excise tax and to file the accompanying return are not imaginary and insub-
stantial."°7 Since petitioner's submission of an excise tax payment with his
responses to the questions on the accompanying form would directly incrim-
inate him, his claim of the privilege against self-incrimination as to the entire tax
payment procedure is valid."0
The Court also found that the Shapiro"' required records doctrine could
not be applied to this case. 10 The opinion defined the doctrine as being com-
posed of three elements: (1) the essential purposes of the inquiry must be
regulatory, (2) the information required must be obtainable through the preser-
vation of records which the regulated party customarily keeps, and (3) the
records must have public aspects rendering them analogous to public docu-
ments. 11 Here, the first and third elements are missing since the statute's re-
quirements affect almost exclusively "individuals inherently suspect of criminal
activities." '12 Also, the information sought lacked the characteristics of a public
document.
Consequently, the Court held that a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination precluded conviction for a failure to pay the tax.313 The tax itself,
however, was constitutional, and claiming the privilege does not eliminate the tax
liability.1 4 But since payment would not be accepted without the accompanying
return, and since both payment and filing the return constituted incriminating
304 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
305 Id. at 63.
306 Id. at 65.
307 Id. at 66.
308 Id. at 67.
309 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
310 390 U.S. at 67.
311 Id. at 68.
312 Id.




evidence, to allow conviction for failure to pay the tax would allow the Govern-
ment to coerce incriminating statements and abolish the protection of the
privilege.
Haynes v. United States15 involved a conviction for the willful possession
of an unregistered firearm. 16 The Court found that, by registering, the registrant
subjected himself to possible prosecution for the possession of a firearm which
at any time was made or transferred without having been registered. 17 The
Court concluded, therefore, that the risks of incrimination created by the regis-
tration requirement are genuine and substantial."' The majority held that the
required records exception to invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion did not apply because: (1) the registration inquiries did not concern a
noncriminal, regulatory area but an area characterized by criminal statutes, and
(2) there were no records or documents to which the public aspects may have
attached." 9 Consequently, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination was
a complete defense to prosecution for failure to register a firearm or for the
possession of an unregistered firearm.
In short, a statute providing for the prosecution of those who fail to disclose
evidence which may also be incriminating is subject to a proper claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Otherwise, the statute would coerce in-
criminating statements from the discloser and thereby render the privilege
against self-incrimination a mockery.
2. Self-incrimination as Applied to Public Officials
A number of cases have involved public officials who invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination with regard to their official duties. In Garrity v. New
Jersey,2' certain New Jersey police officers were questioned during an investiga-
tion of alleged irregularities in the processing of municipal court cases. Before
questioning, each officer was advised that anything he said could be used against
him in a state criminal proceeding, that he could refuse to answer if the response
might tend to incriminate him, but that a refusal would subject him to removal
from office.' These alternatives were based on a New Jersey statute which
provided that the refusal to answer on the basis that the answer might tend to
incriminate the responder would result in removal from, or forfeiture of, office. 2
The answers were then used in subsequent prosecutions.
The Court held that the alternative presented appellants, job forfeiture or
self-incrimination, "is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain
silent." 2 4 The statements were the result of coercion and could not be sustained
315 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
316 Id. at 86-87.
317 Id. at 97.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 98-99.
320 Id. at 100.
321 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
322 Id. at 494.
323 Id. at 494-95 n.1.
324 Id. at 497.
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as voluntary. 25 The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment's protec-
tion against coerced statements prohibits the use in subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings of statements made under threat of removal from office. 6 In dictum,
the Court stated that this protection extended to all, not just to policemen. A
statute, therefore, may not make the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation grounds for the forfeiture of, or removal from, public office.
In Gardner v. Broderick,27 the Court began to hone the privilege against
self-incrimination as applied to public servants. Here, appellant police officer
appeared before a grand jury investigating police bribery and corruption; the
grand jury planned to question him regarding the performance of his official
duties. He refused to sign a form waiving immunity from prosecution and was
discharged solely because of his refusal. 28 The Court noted that New York
City was empowered by statute to discharge any public officer who either
refused to answer any question regarding city affairs on the ground that his
answer would tend to incriminate him, or refused to waive immunity from pros-
ecution on any matter about which he was requested to testify.
3 29
The Court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination may be
knowingly and voluntarily waived. And the privilege cannot be claimed if there
is a grant of immunity from federal and state use of the coerced testimony in a
criminal prosecution against the testifier.3 The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was seen by the court as prohibiting any attempt at coercing a waiver of
the immunity it confers on penalty of discharge from public employment. 31
However, if appellant policeman had refused to answer questions narrowly
related to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive
immunity from prosecution, the privilege would not have barred his dismissal. 2
Here, the appellant was discharged not for failure to answer relevant questions
regarding the performance of his official duties, but for his refusal to waive the
constitutional protection afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination.
Exercising common sense, the Court notes that petitioner's testimony was
demanded, not to obtain an accounting of his performance, but for use in a
criminal prosecution, for there would be no reason to coerce a waiver of im-
munity from prosecution if no prosecution, but only an accounting of perfor-
mance, had been the goal in questioning petitioner. 3
Thus, a public official can be discharged for refusing to answer questions
related to the-performance of his official duties, but he cannot be discharged for
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination (including a refusal to waive im-
munity from prosecution) as the basis for his refusal to answer. If the purpose
of the disclosure is solely to evaluate official conduct, the public servant may be
discharged for refusing to answer questions since the privilege does not apply
325 Id. at 497-98.
326 Id. at 500.
327 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
328 Id. at 274-75.
329 Id. at 275 n.3.
330 Id. at 276.
331 Id. at 279.
332 Id. at 278.
333 Id. at 279.
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when statements are not to be used in a subsequent prosecution.3 4 If he is asked
to waive the privilege against self-incrimination, however, subsequent prosecu-
tion apparently is intended, and the public servant can claim the privilege and
refuse to testify; he cannot be discharged for invoking the privilege and refusing
to testify.
Another self-incrimination decision involving public servants is Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation.33 An investigation of
corruption in the New York City Department of Sanitation was begun. In ac-
cordance with the authority granted the city, noted in the preceding case dis-
cussion, 3 some petitioners were dismissed because of their refusal to testify by
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, and others were dismissed for
their refusal to sign waivers of immunity from prosecution.337 The Court con-
cluded that petitioners "were not discharged merely for refusal to account for
their conduct as employees of the [C]ity."3 ' Instead, they were discharged for
invoking or refusing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Majority reaffirmed its view that if New York had required petitioners to answer
questions directly related to the performance of their official duties on penalty of
discharge from public employment without requiring waiver of the privilege,
the petitioners could have been discharged for refusing to answer.3 9
In sum, a public servant may be dismissed for refusing to answer questions
intended and designed to secure evidence solely to aid in evaluating the public
servant's performance. He has no constitutional protection against answering
such questions. And, of course, he may be dismissed after a hearing that meets
due process requirements if his conduct is deemed to be substandard. But if the
purpose of the questions is to elicit evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution,
the public servant may invoke the privilege and refuse to answer. To dismiss
him for refusing to answer in this situation constitutes an unconstitutional at-
tempt to coerce a waiver of the privilege, which may be waived only voluntarily.
Attempting to coerce a waiver of the privilege reveals that the purpose of the
questioning is to provide evidence for a criminal trial. Of course, the public
servant's refusal to answer may stimulate the authorities to investigate his
conduct independently. Evidence of improper conduct obtained from inde-
pendent sources would be admissible in a dismissal hearing or criminal prosecu-
tion.
3. Other Self-incrimination Cases
During the 1973 term, the Supreme Court, in Lefkowitz v. Turley,4"
again discussed the privilege against self-incrimination. If any party contracting
with New York refused to waive immunity from prosecution or to answer ques-
334 Id.
335 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
336 See the discussion in the text accompanying note 329 sup-ra.
337 392 U.S. at 282-83.
338 Id. at 283.
339 Id. at 284.
340 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
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fions when summoned to testify regarding his contracts with the State or any of
its subdivisions, the State of New York was empowered by statute to cancel his
existing contracts and to disqualify the party from additional contracts with New
York for a five-year period.341 Appellee architects were summoned to testify
before a New York grand jury investigating bribery and corruption but refused to
sign waivers of the privilege. The investigating district attorney then notified
various contracting authorities of appellees' conduct.342
The Court recognized that a state has a strong interest in maintaining the
integrity both of its civil service and of its transactions with independent con-
tractors. Of equal importance is the interest of a state in the enforcement of its
criminal laws.34 However, immunity sufficient to satisfy the privilege against
self-incrimination must be granted in order to compel self-incriminating
answers. " ' The Majority concluded that New York's intention was to compel
testimony that 'Was not immunized.345 A waiver obtained by threat of substantial
economic sanction such as the loss of public contracts, the Court observed, is not
voluntary. There is no constitutional difference between threatening a state
employee with loss of his job and threatening a contractor with loss of public
contracts for refusing to waive the privilege.
346
Although a state is precluded by the fifth and fourteenth amendments from
compelling self-incriminating testimony from its employees and contractors that
may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding, such testimony may be com-
pelled if it or its derivatives cannot be used in such proceedings. 4 ' Just as state
employees, if they are granted adequate immunity, may be required to answer
questions about their job performance or lose their public employment, so a
state may require that those with whom it contracts answer relevant inquiries
about their performance of public contracts or suffer cancellation of existing
contracts and disqualification from contracting with public agencies for a stated
future period. 4 The state may not, however, compel those with whom it
contracts to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and consent to the use
of their testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. Any such testimony
obtained in response to a threat of employment loss is compelled and inadmis-
sible. 49 Answers may be obtained in response to threatened employment loss if
the witness is granted immunity sufficient to supplant the privilege, but the state
may not require a waiver of such immunity."'
A self-incrimination decision relevant to political appointments is Orloff v.
Willoughby,35 which involved a medical doctor who was denied a commission
following induction into the Army because of his refusal to complete a loyalty
certificate required of commissioned officers. The Court held, inter alia, that
341 Id. at 71.
342 Id. at 76.
343 Id. at 79.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 82.
346 Id. at 83.
347 Id. at 84.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 85.
350 Id.
351 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination provided a valid basis for
the Government's refusal to "appoint him to a post of honor and trust.'
5'
The appointing authority has the right to inquire and learn facts affecting the
appointee's fitness for the appointive post. Thus, any refusal to answer questions
may be made the basis for a refusal to appoint or confirm a person aspiring to a
position of public trust or for the disqualification of elective candidates.
Under Orloff, therefore, appointees to public positions may be refused con-
firmation or may have their appointments withdrawn before the effective dates
because of a refusal to answer questions relevant to their fitness for public office
by invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This rationale also
applies to elective candidates; such potential public servants may not be coerced
into waiving the privilege, but they may be disqualified from seeking elective
office because of a refusal to answer pertinent questions.
Another relevant decision is Bryson v. United States."' Petitioner was con-
victed of falsely and fraudulently denying affiliation with the Communist Party
in an affidavit filed with the National Labor Relations Board. The Court re-
affirmed the principle that fraud and deceit are not excused by a claim that a
statute is unconstitutional.3 4 Another statute's unconstitutionality is no defense
to a prosecution for fraud.'55 Applying this concept to the instant case, the Court
held that an individual may refuse to answer Government questions infringing
his constitutional rights, or he may answer them honestly, but he cannot with
impunity knowingly answer falsely.' 56 In short, if the privilege against self-
incrimination applies, it should be invoked and the question not answered; if
the question is answered, however, it must be answered truthfully.
In California v. Byers,"7 the Court again discussed the privilege against
self-incrimination. Although the precedential value is weakened somewhat by
announcement in a plurality opinion, the decision formulates principles relevant
to this discussion. Respondent Byers was charged with failing to stop and
identify himself after a vehicle accident. The Court held that in order to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination, it must be shown that the compelled dis-
closures will create a substantial risk of self-incrimination."' Thus, the "stop and
identify" requirement does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination
because: ( 1 ) it is directed at all persons and not at a group suspected of criminal
conduct, (2) the required disclosures do not involve a substantial risk of self-
incrimination, (3) the statutory purpose is noncriminal, and (4) self-reporting is
essential to fulfillment of the noncriminal purpose.'59 The Court found further
that the act of stopping one's vehicle at the scene of an accident does not provide
testimonial evidence within the constitutional meaning. Leaving one's name at
the scene of an accident "identifies but does not by itself implicate anyone in
352 Id. at 91.
353 396 U.S. 64 '(1969).
354 Id. at 68.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 72.
357 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
358 Id. at 429 (plurality opinion).
359 Id. at 430-31 (plurality opinion).
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criminal conduct."3 6 Thus there is no constitutional right of refusal to file a
required report or statement in order to avoid the mere possibility of self-in-
crimination.
4. The Effect of Immunity Grants
The Supreme Court has discussed grants of immunity against prosecution
as a means of overcoming a refusal to answer questions by invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. The first decision, Kastigar v. United
States,3"' involved the federal government but is applicable to the states through
the second decision, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation.6
Kastigar presented the issue whether the United States must grant use and
derivative use immunity or transactional immunity in order to compel testimony
from a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. 6 The
majority held that a grant of immunity from prosecution must grant protection
equal to that of the privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity need
not be greater." 4 The test of such equality is whether the immunity grant leaves
the witness and the prosecution in substantially the position both would have
occupied had the witness claimed the privilege against self-incrimination. In
such a case, the immunity, being equal to the privilege, replaces the privilege.
The Majority opinion concluded that immunity from use and derivative
use is equal to the scope of the privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony
over invocation of the privilege. 65 Transactional immunity, since it grants
complete immunity from prosecution for any offense to which the forced testi-
mony relates, grants more extensive protection than does the privilege against
self-incrimination.
3 6
Zicarelli367 involved an appellant subpoenaed to testify concerning organized
crime and corruption in Long Branch, New Jersey. Appellant invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer a series of one hundred
questions. 6 The Court held, inter alia, that immunity from use and derivative
use of compelled self-incriminating testimony by state authorities is equal to the
protection guaranteed by the privilege against self-incrimination and is sufficient
to compel testimony. 6 9
Thus, one method of compelling testimony regarding the performance of
official duties or one's fitness for public office is to grant immunity from use and
derivative use of the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings.
If the compelled testimony reflects unfavorably on performance or fitness, the
public servant can be removed from office and the appointee's appointment
withdrawn or not confirmed. Such actions are civil in nature and do not in-
360 Id. at 434 (plurality opinion).
361 406 U.S. 441, reh. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972).
362 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
363 406 U.S. at 443.
364 Id. at 453.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
368 Id at 474.
369 Id. at 475-76.
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volve criminal proceedings in which immunized testimony is being used in
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
5. Conclusion
It is now appropriate to apply the preceding case discussions to the drafting
of the model act and necessary model constitutional amendments. First, even
if the privilege applies to a particular disclosure situation, the discloser cannot
file a willfully false statement. He must answer honestly or assert the privilege
and refuse to disclose the required information. Thus, it is constitutionally per-
missible to establish criminal penalties for the willful filing of false financial dis-
closure statements.
The public servant may not be removed from office for asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination. Such action reveals that the evidence sought
is intended for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution, which renders the
privilege operative. Any attempt at coercing a waiver of the privilege, such as
by requiring dismissal from office for the refusal to waive the privilege and
answer questions, is unconstitutional.
But the public official or employee may be dismissed for refusing to answer
questions regarding his official performance in a noncriminal hearing. The
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply directly to a noncriminal pro-
ceeding. There must still be no attempt, however, at coercing a waiver of the
privilege since this converts the proceeding into a quest for criminal evidence
and renders the privilege operative. Presence of such coercion will preclude dis-
missal for failure to disclose requested, but self-incriminating, information.
The model act creates criminal penalties for the filing of a false disclosure
statement.. but allows dismissal from office for the refusal or failure to file the
required statement." 1 Separate sections proscribe specified misconduct, 372 but
no evidence of same is required to be disclosed in the financial statement."7
Any disclosure of criminal conduct constitutes a voluntary waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination."7 * Of course, the submission of any information not
required by the disclosure statute but which constitutes evidence of the violation
of the criminal portion of the model act can be used in a criminal prosecution
since the privilege has been voluntarily waived in such a situation; there has
been no coerced waiver.
Furthermore, under the Byers"' doctrine, the privilege is not violated by the
disclosure provisions of the model act because they are not directed at a group
inherently suspected of criminal activity. The required disclosures do not involve
a substantial risk of self-incrimination, since their purpose is noncriminal and
essential to fulfilling a noncriminal, regulatory purpose. However, in the interest
of complete fairness and due process, the model act allows invocation of the
370 See Appendix B, Model Act § 7 (a).
371 See id. at § 8(c).
372 See id. at §§ 9-16.
373 See id. at § 8(c) (1).
374 See id. at §§ 8(c) (3), 8(c) (4).
375 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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privilege.7 and provides for the granting of immunity from prosecution. 7
Finally, under the model constitutional amendments, appointees to public
positions will be denied appointment378 or confirmation 79 because of a refusal
or failure to file a required financial disclosure statement. Similarly, candidates
for elective office will be disqualified because of a refusal or failure to file a
required financial disclosure statement.""
C. Financial Disclosure Provisions of the Model Act
The model act's provisions concerning financial disclosure attempt to ignore
insubstantial and remote interests or relationships that do not present a danger of
causing official misconduct. The model act also attempts to limit the invasion
of the public servant's financial privacy to that which is necessary to protect the
public interest.
The de minimis concept recognizes that, in a practical sense, some interests
are too insignificant to cause official misconduct. 8 ' Relationships may be so
remote as to create little danger of causing an abuse of public office. 8 2 Exclusion
of such interests or relationships from regulation is justified by balancing the goal
of promoting actual and apparent governmental integrity against the necessity
of recruiting competent public servants.38" The goal of the act, therefore, is to
require disclosure only by those public servants occupying positions of public trust
providing both opportunity and temptation for official misconduct.
The financial disclosure provisions, §§ 6, 7, and 8, of the model act
are as follows:
Public access to financial disclosure statements and adequate availability of
copying services are required. Reasonable copying fees must be paid, however.
It is a felony to file a materially false statement of economic interests. If
the convicted public servant, appointee, or elective candidate presents no danger
to himself or to society, he is sentenced to perform free public service in a position
that will utilize his abilities and experience. Off-duty hours are spent in con-
finement. Such punishment should satisfy society's desire for retribution, provide
the required deterrent effect concerning potential offenders, and aid in any
needed rehabilitation of the convict.
The defendant may be tried by a jury and has rights of appeal. The state
representative is also authorized to appeal any verdict directly to the state's
highest appellate court. Also, both parties may appeal any final ruling of the
trial judge directly to the state's highest appellate court.
The refusal to file a financial disclosure statement is a basis for removal
from office, but no criminal prosecution *for such refusal may be pursued. In-
dependent evidence may be used in a criminal prosecution for official mis-
376 See Appendix B, Model Act § 8(c)(1).
377 See id. at § (d)(1).
378 See Appendix A, Model Constitutional Amendment II, § 2.
379 See id. at § 1.
380 See id. at § 3.
381 Note, supna note 160, at 680.
382 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 404.
383 Pennsylvania, supira note 136, at 94 n. 91.
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conduct, however. A civil forfeiture of $100 per day is established for the tardy
filing of any required financial disclosure statement.
Anyone required to file a financial disclosure statement may, when appro-
priate, refuse by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. The refusal
to file under other circumstances may not be used as the basis for a criminal
prosecution although it is grounds for removal from office. These removal
proceedings are grounded on the refusal to provide relevant information, not on
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Any evidence of criminal conduct provided in the financial disclosure
statement is deemed to be a voluntary waiver of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation since the model act permits invocation of the privilege and does not coerce
any waiver. Thus, any statements contained in the disclosure statement may be
used in any subsequent criminal or civil action or suit instituted by the state
against the discloser.
If immunity from use or derivative use in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion of any compelled self-incriminating testimony is granted, a financial dis-
closure statement must be filed. Evidence produced may be used in any civil
proceeding to remove incumbents from office, to deny appointment or confirma-
tion to potential appointees, and, possibly, to disqualify candidates for elective
office. This evidence also may be used in a private civil action against the dis-
closer.
IV. Conduct Proscribed by the Act
The following sections discuss proscribed conduct committed by public
servants. Violations are felonies and result in sentences of free public service
combined with imprisonment. Final conviction for any of these offenses results
in automatic removal from any public office or position currently occupied by
the involved public servant. Also discussed are various civil remedies available
to the state and private parties applicable to official misconduct.
A. Section 9: Interests in Contracts Awarded by a Governmental Body
In the regulation of official misconduct, "contract prohibitions" concern
the awarding of government contracts in which a public servant has an
interest.114 "Self-dealing" concerns a public servant's private interests in any
matter involving a governmental body.'85 The former will be discussed first.
It has been noted that a public servant's securing of a profitable contract
for his private benefit probably incites more public wrath and indignation than
any other form of official misconduct.' If the public servant has some con-
nection with a government contract, he may be forced to choose between his
own best interests and those of the government.'87 It is also possible that a public
384 Id. at 97 n. 110.
385 Id.
386 Legislative Comment, supra note 140, at 402.
387 Note, supra note 134, at 987.
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servant having an interest in a contract may exert whatever influence he
possesses to pressure the public official or employee who has responsibility con-
cerning the contract to favor the pressuring party.18  The second party is then
forced to choose between the proper discharge of his duties and appeasement of
the pressuring public servant." 9 Thus, the public servant's discretion and its
exercise afford him the ability to benefit private interests. 9
Whenever public servants hold positions of public trust without divestiture
of their private economic interests, the foundation is laid for a valid concern
that governmental efficiency and economy will suffer. 91 To prevent actual mis-
conduct, one view holds that the public officer or employee should be precluded
from having an interest at any time during his term of office in any contract
requiring official consideration. 9 A more practical view realizes that requiring
complete divestment of private economic interests will deter many competent
individuals from pursuing government service."' The problem is to protect the
public from self-interested public servants without unnecessarily fettering govern-
mental recruitment."9
Perhaps the most workable solution is that which requires the public servant
to disclose any interest he has in the award of a government contract, to refrain
from influencing any decision on the award, to refrain from voting or issuing any
decision pertinent to the award, and to execute a certificate that he has complied
with these requirements. 95 If such self-disqualifications become too frequent, the
electorate should remedy the situation at a subsequent election if the public
servant is elected. If he is appointed, public pressure may force his resignation
or discharge. This disclosure and self-disqualification approach is adopted in
section 9 of the model act.
Special considerations apply when a certain firm is the sole supplier of a
good or service. 9 It is foolish to ban contracts with sole-supplier firms in which
officials or employees have interests. 9 ' The model act does not require disclosure
and self-disqualification in such instances. However, any claim of sole supplier
status must be closely scrutinized."9
The disclosure and self-disqualification requirement is not obviated by
competitive bidding for the contract award. The possibility of eroding the
public protection afforded by competitive bidding stems from the public servant's
discretion in the selection of which suppliers to notify regarding requests for
bids, 99 his discretion in determining the extent of advertising for bids,400 his
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 Ta-x. L. Rxv., supra note 172, at 954.
391 Comment, supra note 216, at 536.
392 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 405.
393 Note, supra note 134, at 986.
394 Id.
395 Comment, supra note 199. at 369; see Note, supra note 167, at 70.
396 Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 690.
397 Id.
398 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 102.
399 Note, supra note 134, at 999.
400 Comment, Municipal Corporations - Right of Taxpayer to Enjoin or Avoid a Con-




discretion in determining who is a responsible bidder""' and the lowest respon-
sible bidder,"02 his discretion when inspecting performance,"' his discretion in
imposing sanctions for faulty performance,"4 and his discretion in the negotia-
tion and determination of contract modifications."'
Excluded from the concept of "interest" in a government contract are
purchases under conditional sales contracts from firms bidding on government
contracts and commercial loans obtained from these firms 0 " in accordance with
prevailing commercial standards in the city in which each loan or retail purchase
occurred. The model act excludes these "interests" from the disclosure and
self-disqualification requirement.
Since privately owned public utility companies usually are the sole source
of the services they provide,407 their rates are subject to state regulation.40
Contracts with such entities are nonconsensual in origin as the utility must supply
all who demand service.0 9 A public servant's interest in such an entity does not
present the possibility of an abuse of office, and such interests are not included
in regulations of the type under consideration. 40 The model act excludes such
interests from the disclosure and self-disqualification requirement.
One view holds that a public servant is not deemed to have a prohibited
"interest" in a governmental contract merely because he voted on a general ap-
propriation bill which appropriated funds to an agency which subsequently
authorized and awarded the contract to him or to a business in which he holds
an interest.41' In effect, such an individual is viewed as having had no contact
with the contract in his official capacity.412 The model act, however, does not
exempt such an official from the disclosure and self-disqualification requirement.
Otherwise, the legislator would not be precluded from exerting his influence in
order to receive a contract award after funds were appropriated to the respon-
sible agency.
One commentator has advocated the use of strong criminal sanctions to
deter public servants from acquiring interests in public contracts.413 The model
act adapts this approach to its disclosure, self-disqualification, and certification
procedure by establishing criminal penalties for perjury or for the failure to
follow the procedure.
The strict rule is that contracts involving interested public servants are
401 Note, supra note 134, at 999.
402 Comment, supra note 400. at 325; Note, supra note 143, at 1055.
403 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 198; Note, supra note 134, at 1000; Note,
supra note 143, at 1055.
404 Note, supra note 134, at 1000.
405 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 198.
406 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 404.
407 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 196.
408 Id.
409 Note, Temptation and Tradition in the California School Board, 5 STAN. L. Rav. 61,
63 (1952).
410 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 196; Note, supra note 409, at 63.
411 Comment, Legislative Bodies - Conflict of Interest - Legislators Prohibited From
Contracting With State, 7 NAT. Ras. J. 296, 300 (1967).
412 Id.
413 Note, Florida's Conflict of Interest Law: A Municipal Windfall, 20 U. Mi mr L. R y.
472, 478 (1965).
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void as violative of public policy.4 14 One study concludes that, by uneven en-
forcement, governmental bodies may use this rule to avoid burdensome contracts
rather than to deter official misconduct. 4"5 For maximum deterrence, the model
act provides for the voiding of such contracts and for the recovery of all illegal
profits.4 6 The risks of voidability and loss of profits, plus criminal sanctions,
should provide sufficient deterrent against official misconduct of the type under
discussion. And, since enforcement, by the state attorney general or a special
prosecutor, is independent of contract authority, there should be little danger that
the act will be invoked only to avoid burdensome contracts.
B. Section 10: Interests in Governmental Transactions
When a public official or employee acts in his official capacity and exer-
cises discretion in a certain matter, "his deeds are permeated with a public
interest.""' No public official or employee should be allowed to act officially on
any matter in which his official action may produce personal benefit to himself
unless the benefit is not peculiar to the official or employee but is shared by all
individuals in the same class.4" Therefore, a statute regulating official mis-
conduct must include both contracts and all official transactions in which dis-
cretion is exercised., 9 Otherwise, there exists a risk that personal interests will
prevail over the public interest or that such an appearance will be presented to
the public, or both.420
A public official or employee should be prohibited from acting officially on
any private party's request (when the benefit is enjoyed only by that private
party and not by a large class) if the acting official or employee has an attach-
ment to or interest in the requesting party.421  "Sentiment and friendship can
exert just as profound an influence as proprietary and financial interests."' 22
Similarly, public officials and employees should not be permitted to exploit their
influence or acquaintance with those public officials and employees responsible




Retail purchases under conditional sales contracts and loans from com-
mercial institutions do not create prohibited interests in a transaction involving
such entities42' when obtained in accordance with prevailing commercial stan-
dards in the city in which each such retail purchase or loan occurred. The other
exclusions pertaining to interests in government contracts"' are inapplicable as
such exclusions would permit circumvention of the noncontractual, and often
414 Note, supra note 160, at 688.
415 Comment, supra note 90, at 367-68.
416 See Appendix B, Model Act §§ 19 and 18, respectively.
417 Frefich & Larson, supra note 162, at 400.
418 Id. at 403.
419 Id. at 400.
420 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 91.
421 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 405.
422 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141, at 195.
423 Eisenberg, supra note 143. at 686.
424 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 404.
425 See the discussion in the text near notes 396-97, 407-10 supra.
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regulatory, area now under discussion.
The strict view prohibits an elected public official from taking any leg-
islative action, including introducing or voting upon a bill, in regard to any
measure or bill in which he has a personal interest."'6 However, the public
official may have been elected because his interests coincide with those of his
constituents;427 he may have a community of interests with his electors.4 28 To
preclude his participating in legislative action may conflict with his duty to
represent his constituents.4 2 Additionally, disqualification at the legislative com-
mittee level conflicts with the need for specialization and assignment of in-
dividuals to committees in which their specialized expertise may be best util-
ized.4"'
Publicity concerning a public official's private interests will help the voters
determine who can best represent them.4 ' Consequently, § 10 of the model
act, which applies to interests in governmental transactions, does not bar par-
ticipation in legislative matters by such officials, but they are subject to the
financial disclosure requirements of §§ 6, 7, and 8.
C. Section 11: Confidential Information
Because of his position, the public official or employee is often aware of
confidential government information that is of value to private interests." 2
Private profit may result from the unauthorized or premature divulging of such
government information."' The public official or employee may use the con-
fidential information himself or disclose it to others; 3 4 in either case, he exploits
his public position for private advantage.3 " When this occurs and the public
learns that public offices have been used to further private advantage rather than
the public interest, confidence in government is weakened."'
The public official or employee should be prohibited from revealing infor-
mation which is not legally or customarily available to the public."' He should
be prohibited from disclosing such information even in the course of employment
obtained after his termination of public service."3 ' In addition, the prohibition
on disclosure or use should endure until the information is made available to the
general public." 9 These principles are enacted in § 11 of the model act.
426 Comment, supra note 136, at 401-02.
427 Note, supra note 177, at 454.
428 Getz, supra note 149, at 192-93; Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 92.
429 Getz, supra note 149, at 12.
430 Id. at 193, 268.
431 Note, supra note 167, at 81.
432 TEx. L. REv., supra note 172, at 951.
433 Note, supra note 143, at 1068.
434 Note, supra note 160, at 686.
435 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 116.
436 Note, supra note 143, at 1068.
437 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 406.
438 See Tax. L. REv., supra note 172, at 952.
439 Id.
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D. Section 12: Assisting in Transactions Involving a Governmental Body
One should not use the acquaintances, contacts, and influence obtained as a
public official or employee to further his private interests or those of others in
transactions involving the governmental unit in which he holds a position of
public trust." " If a public servant represents private interests before a govern-
ment agency, there is a danger that he will be able to exert undue influence on
the agency to gain a favorable ruling or decision."' And if the official or em-
ployee has supervisory responsibilities in the agency, there is the danger that he
will be incapable of exercising objective judgment in his supervisory role." 2
However, the citizen's best recourse for dealing with government is his elected
representative, " ' who is expected to act in constituents' behalf in their contacts
with the executive branch" If the elective official refuses to so represent his
constituents, "he may expect very soon to be retired to private life."445 Further-
more, it contradicts the underlying concept of representative government to
isolate public officials from the pressure of their constituents. 46 The chief ob-
jection to legislation regulating the representation of private parties by public
officials and employees before governmental agencies is that such laws deter the
recruitment of professionals, especially attorneys, into government service." 7
Statutes regulating official misconduct should not include the public of-
ficial's performance of his constituency-service role in which representation is
performed free of charge and in fulfillment of the obligations of his public
office." 8 Official misconduct may arise only when representation is undertaken
for profit. 49 Thus, contingent fees payable to an individual or his partner for
such representation should be prohibited. 5 This approach seeks to protect the
public interest without unnecessarily restricting the outside activities of public
officials.' 51 In addition, the public servant should be prohibited from the repre-
sentation of corporations in which he holds financial interests since he will benefit.
at least indirectly, 52 from favorable agency decisions.
To allow the public servant to represent a client before a government agency
when he believes the client should win, as suggested by some commentators,
would permit the dishonest public servant to circumvent the statute merely by
falsely stating that he believed his client should prevail before the agency.453
But the prohibition on representation need not apply to instances before courts
since they are more independent of the public servant's influence, especially
440 Note, supra note 167, at 78.
441 Note, supra note 160, at 684.
442 Id.
443 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 84.
444 Getz, supra note 149, at 169.
445 P. DOUGLAS, supra note 188, at 88.
446 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 83.
447 Note, supra note 134, at 1005.
448 Comment, supra note 136, at 387.
449 Id.
450 Tx. L. Rnv., supra note 172, at 950; Note, supra note 143, at 1067.
451 Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 680; Note, supra note 160, at 685.
452 See Getz, supra note 149, at 30.
453 Note, supra note 177, at 460.
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when legislators are involved, than are state agencies."" Section 12 of the model
act reflects this view.
E. Section 13: Income from Outside Sources
Several writers have considered the problem of regulating income earned
from outside sources455 since this income is viewed as a cause of official mis-
conduct. However, since this problem is better controlled by other sections of the
model act, no separate provision is made for income from outside sources other
than the prohibition of bribery.
F. Section 14: Ex Parte Communications
Whenever any determination or award is to be made after a public hear-
ing, all considerations relevant to the final action should be made public.45
Any public servant who encourages, makes, or accepts any relevant unilateral
communication prior to a determination or award and fails to make such com-
munication a part of the record acts illegally.45 ' The model act prohibits such
conduct.
G. Section 15: Gifts
The acceptance by public officials and employees of gifts and favors from
outsiders may impair both the recipient's objectivity,4 58 by influencing him to
perform his official duties so as to benefit the donor,4 59 and the public image of
integrity pertaining to the governmental unit with which he is associated.46
Gardiner's study of political corruption4 6' reveals that gifts are one of the
methods used in buying protection from the law enforcement process.462 Con-
sequently, no gifts should be solicited or accepted from private parties except,
perhaps, in situations in which reciprocation is not ordinarily expected.463
One proposal bans the acceptance of gifts exceeding a certain total from
any one donor which might reasonably tend to influence the donee's performance
of his official duties.464 It is submitted that the better view is that which pro-
hibits the receipt of any gift, regardless of its size, under circumstances where the
recipient knows or should know that it is intended to, or will, influence the
recipient's official conduct.465 The model act employs the latter view.
454 See Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 108.
455 E.g., Comment, supra note 136, at 381; Note, supra note 177, at 454, 460; Note,
supra note 204, at 306-07; Note, supra note 136, at 1209-10; Note, suprz note 160, at 684;
Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 83, 119-20.
456 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 405.
457 Id. at 405-06.
458 Comment, supra note 136, at 391.
459 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 111-12.
460 See Comment, supra note 136, at 391.
461 Wincanton, supra note 67.
462 Id. at 66.
463 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162. at 405.
464 Comment, supra note 136, at 393-94; Tnx. L. Rav., supra note 172, at 949.
465 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 112.
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H. Section 16: Postemployment
A situation providing the potential for abuse is that involving former public
officials and employees whose subsequent activities in the private sector involve
the representation of persons before governmental agencies. 6 Potential abuses
include the use of specialized knowledge for private gain, the exploitation of
acquaintances, and the exploitation of knowledge of specific cases in which the
former public servant was involved." 7 The objective is to regulate those public
servants who are lured from public service by private interests wishing to utilize
the technical specialization and personal contacts of such public officials and
employees. "' This regulatory objective must be balanced against the indi-
vidual's right to select his occupation. 6"
One view holds that, due to the insecurity of legislative service and the
small salaries received for the service, postlegislative-service employment restric-
tions are unreasonable.7 Another proposal advocates prohibiting a former
legislative member, for a one- or two-year period, from receiving compensation
for assisting anyone with matters that were before the legislative body during the
former member's term." 1 And compensated lobbying by a former member
should be prohibited for a period of one or two years. 72 Section 16 of the model
act attempts to regulate relevant conduct of former legislative members by
employing the latter view.
The model act regulates more extensively the subsequent employment
activities of former nonlegislative public officials and employees. The advantages
of public servants, when representing persons before any agency of state, county,
or local government, and especially the unit in which the former public servant
was involved, are obvious but decrease over time 73 Thus, the former public
servant and his partners should be prohibited from engaging in transactions
with, or representation before, only the governmental unit with which the
former public servant was associated. 4 The ban should endure for two years
after the severing of public serviceY
I. Section 17: Special Employees
Because of the increasingly complex tasks which modem government is
obligated to undertake, it often becomes necessary to rely on the special knowl-
edge and abilities of consultants and other temporary employees.476 Such person-
nel spend only a limited portion of their professional time in government
466 Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 685.
467 Id.
468 Id.; Note, supra note 160, at 683.
469 Kaufmann & Widiss, supra note 141. at 204; Note, supra note 160, at 683.
470 Comment, supra note 136, at 387.
471 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 122.
472 Id.
473 See Note, supra note 167, at 79.
474 Note, supra note 160, at 683, 690.
475 Id. at 690.
476 Id. at 686; Note, supra note 143, at 1052.
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service. 77 To strictly regulate the conduct of these employees would seriously
deter their recruitment 78 since it is unreasonable to require them to divest them-
selves of business interests or to penalize either the companies who employ them,
or those in which these employees hold financial interests. 7 '
Government should not be forced, by overly strict regulation of employee
conduct, to sacrifice the best advice and expertise available. 80 While limiting the
regulation of special employees' conduct is appropriate since they have such a
tenuous connection with government although their services are often of par-
ticular importance," ' there is the possibility that these employees will also abuse
their public employment for personal gain. 82
A special employee is one who may or may not be compensated for his
services, and who serves a limited number of hours or days in any annual
period." 3 Elected officials are excluded from the special employee classifica-
tion,8 4 and it has been proposed that holders of major political appointments
also should be excluded.8 '
Once qualified as a special employee, the individual should be subject to
statutes regulating official misconduct only as to those transactions in which his
personal participation is or was substantial."8 ' One proposal is that the governor
be given authority to make exceptions for such employees when the public
interest so requires.""7 The model act adopts what is believed to be the better
view, that which establishes both definite standards for designation as a special
employee and the results of such classification. 88
J. Sections 18 and 19: Constructive Trust, Voidability of Contracts
and Transactions, and Private Party Actions
Government officials and employees are servants of the people and, there-
fore, act as fiduciaries in their relationships with the public.8 9 As fiduciaries, they
owe the public the primary duty of loyalty."9" Employment of the fiduciary
principle allows the equitable remedy of an accounting which enables the com-
munity to recover illegal profits upon judicial recognition of the public official
or employee's abuse of trust. 9' If the public can recover all the illegal profits
gained by a disloyal public official or employee, the incentive for official mis-
conduct will disappear 2 or at least be reduced. 9' This objective is fulfilled by
477 Note, supra note 160, at 686.
478 See Note, supra note 134, at 1016.
479 Note, supra note 143, at 1052.
480 Buss, supra note 191, at 381.
481 Id.




486 Id. at 687, 691.
487 Note, supra note 167, at 70, 77.
488 See Note. supra note 160, at 691.
489 Johnson, Responsibility for Integrity in Government, 35 ALA. LAw. 12, 15 (1974).
490 Note, supra note 168, at 1501.
491 TEx. L. Rrv., supra note 172, at 946.
492 Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public Office, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 214, 215 (1954).
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the imposition of a constructive trust."" The disloyal public servant, as the
constructive trustee for the benefit of the public, can never truly acquire title to
his illegal profits. 95
A statute seeking to employ the above principles should utilize the con-
structive trust principle that no one should be permitted to profit from his wrong-
ful conduct. 9 The statute should include the principle that a change in the form
of the proceeds of such conduct does not preclude recovery if the proceeds can
be traced and are not in the possession of a bona fide purchaser for value 97
Another advantage of the constructive trust as a tool for the control of
official misconduct is that this remedy employs the simpler procedures of equity
rather than the more complex procedures of a criminal proceeding. 9 Also, since
it involves a civil proceeding, the rights afforded criminal defendants by the
fifth and sixth amendments are inapplicable.499 Imposition of a constructive
trust does not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law."0
And furthermore, by authorizing the governmental unit to recover all illegal
profits gained from the official misconduct, the problems inherent in determin-
ing the actual damages caused by such conduct are avoided. 1 The govern-
mental unit then holds the recovery subject to the rights of third parties damaged
by the public servant's misconduct. 2
The model act employs the above views. It also allows the constructive
trust as a remedy supplementing others that are available under the act.
The governmental unit should be permitted to avoid any obligation created
by a contract or transaction that was effected by official misconduct.503 The
model act establishes this equitable remedy, which is supplementary to others
available to the government. Thus, the government may criminally prosecute
the disloyal public servant, subject him to the imposition of a constructive trust
on illegal profits, seek a decree voiding a contract or transaction effected by
official misconduct, or utilize any combination of all three remedies.
Since Model Constitutional Amendment III, § 3 provides for automatic
removal from office upon final conviction for official misconduct, or upon final
imposition of a constructive trust upon property, funds, and profits gained from
official misconduct, or upon a final decree that a government contract or trans-
action is void because of official misconduct, the model act confers no standing
upon a private party to initiate any of the aforementioned civil actions or suits.
493 Comment, Public Officials-Restitution-Constructive Trust-Municipality May Re-
cover Salary Kickbacks Paid by Employees to Officials, 40 MINN. L. Rav. 880, 881 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as MINN. L. Rav.]; see Comment, Constructive Trusts - Kickbacks to
Elected Public Officials - Proper Party Plaintiff, 10 RuTG. L. REV. 443, 445 '(1955).
494 Lenhoff, supra note 492, at 215.
495 Id.
496 Patterson, An Anti-Godfather Statute: Impressing a Constructive Trust on the Fruits
of Crime, 32 FED. B.J. 117, 123 (1973).
497 Id.
498 Lenhoff, supra note 492, at 216.
499 Patterson, supra note 496, at 127.
500 Id. at 126.
501 Pennsylvania, supra note 136, at 124.
502 See MINN. L. Rav., supra note 493, at 883.
503 Freilich & Larson, supra note 162, at 409, 419.
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The model act does permit a private party to initiate a civil damage action
against the public servant to recover the damages suffered by the private party
if the attorney general or special prosecutor refuses to initiate any criminal action
or civil action or suit against the same public servant. If the government has
recovered illegal profits through the imposition of a constructive trust, a private
party may initiate a civil damage action against the public servant to recover
the damages suffered by such party in excess of his pro rata share of the govern-
ment's total recovery.
V. General Conclusions
Enacting a statute is not always the most effective method of preventing
undesirable conduct." 4 Before such a statute is passed, a determination should
be made that the undesirable conduct can be controlled effectively by the
criminal justice system." 5 In the control of official misconduct, the relevant
question is what, if any, aid the law may offer." 6
High eithical standards are based primarily on individual conscience, but
legislation can establish the guidelines of proper behavior for public officials
and employees."0 7 Such legislation may also deter official misconduct.0 ' Statu-
tory enactments will not create honest public servants, but legislation can offer
substantial encouragement to their development. 0'
The model act reflects the conclusions of this article that the most effective
means of controlling official misconduct of public servants include criminal
prosecutions, removal from office or position, and the forfeiture of all property
and funds gained from official misconduct. As an added deterrent, private
citizens are also given standing to recover actual damages caused by the mis-
conduct of public servants.
504 A. MoRms, supra note 48, at 157.
505 Grupp, supra note 6, at 4.
506 Buss, supra note 191, at 301.
507 Note, supra note 177, at 464.
508 Id.
509 Nowlin, Legislative Ethics, 1973, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 456, 473 (1973).
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APPENDIX A
Model Constitutional Amendments
Necessary to Implement the Model Act
Amendment I
Elimination of Public Officials'
and Employees' Immunity
Section 1. State civil or criminal action. No elected or appointed official or
employee of any branch of state, county, or municipal government of this state
shall be immune from any civil action or suit or criminal action authorized by
appropriate legislation and instituted by the state Attorney General or a Special
Prosecutor appointed by the Governor for any official misconduct, as defined by
appropriate legislation, by reason of incumbency in any state, county, or muni-
cipal office or position either at the time of committing the alleged misconduct or
at the time of trial. The penalties shall be those established by this constitution
and by appropriate legislation for such misconduct.
Section 2. Private damage action. No elected or appointed official or
employee of any branch of state, county, or municipal government of this state
shall be immune from any civil action authorized by appropriate legislation and
instituted by a private party for damages suffered as a consequence of the
official misconduct, as defined by appropriate legislation, of such public official
or employee, by reason of incumbency in any state, county, or municipal office
or position either at the time of committing the alleged misconduct or at the
time of trial.
Section 3. Removal from office. No elected or appointed official or em-
ployee of any branch of state, county, or municipal government of this state shall
be immune from any civil action or suit instituted by the state Attorney Gen-
eral or a Special Prosecutor appointed by the Governor to remove such official
or employee from office or position for a refusal or failure to file a complete
statement of economic interests required by appropriate legislation, by reason of
incumbency in any state, county, or municipal office or position either at the
time of the alleged refusal or failure to file or at the time of the civil action or
suit.
Amendment II
Denial of Appointee Confirmation,
Automatic Withdrawal of Appointments
and Disqualification of Elective Candidates
Section 1. Denial of appointee confirmation. The state Senate shall refuse
to confirm any person appointed to a public office or position by the Governor
if such appointee refuses or fails to file a complete statement of economic inter-
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ests, required by appropriate legislation, by the date specified in such legislation.
Section 2: Automatic withdrawal of appointments. The appointment of
any person to any office or position in any branch of state, county, or municipal
government of this state, except appointees to offices or positions requiring con-
firmation by the state Senate within section 1 of this Amendment, shall be with-
drawn automatically prior to the effective date of such appointment if the ap-
pointee refuses or fails to file a complete statement of economic interests, re-
quired by appropriate legislation, by the date specified in such legislation.
Section 3. Disqualifiation of elective candidates. Any candidate for any
elective office in this state, other than the office of state Attorney General, who
refuses or fails to file a complete statement of economic interests, required by
appropriate legislation, by the date specified in such legislation, shall be dis-
qualified from seeking such office by the state Attorney General. Any candidate
for the office of state Attorney General who refuses or fails to file a complete
statement of economic interests, required by appropriate legislation, by the date
specified in such legislation, shall be disqualified from seeking such office by the
Governor.
Amendment III
Trial of Public Officials and Employees,
Removal from Office, and Jurisdiction
of Legislature and Attorney General
or Special Prosecutor
Section 1. Official misconduct trial. Any elected or appointed official or
employee of any branch of state, county, or municipal government of this state
shall be subject to any criminal action or civil action or suit authorized by ap-
propriate legislation and instituted by the state Attorney General or by a Special
Prosecutor appointed by the Governor, under conditions specified by appropriate
legislation, for the alleged commission of official misconduct, defined by appro-
priate legislation, in a trial court of record designated by appropriate legislation
for such purpose.
Section 2. Removal trial. Any elected or appointed official or employee of
any branch of state, county, or municipal government of this state shall be subject
to a civil action or suit, in a trial court of record designated by appropriate
legislation for such purpose, instituted by the state Attorney General or a Special
Prosecutor appointed by the Governor, under conditions specified in appropriate
legislation, to remove such official or employee from office or position for the
refusal or failure to file a complete statement of economic interests required by
appropriate legislation, by the date specified in such legislation. Such civil action
or suit shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of equity procedure
except that there shall be a jury trial in such action or suit unless waived by the
official or employee involved.
Section 3. Automatic removal from office. A final criminal conviction for
official misconduct, as defined by appropriate legislation, or a final court im-
(April 1976]
MODEL ACT FOR CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
position of a constructive trust upon property, funds, or profits gained by a public
official or employee from official misconduct, as defined by appropriate legisla-
tion, or a final court decree voiding a government contract or transaction for
official misconduct, as defined by appropriate legislation, shall result in automatic
removal of the involved public official or employee from any public office or
position held at the time of final conviction, final imposition of a constructive
trust, or final decree, in addition to any additional penalties prescribed by ap-
propriate legislation. A civil action or suit to impose a constructive trust or to
declare a government contract or transaction void shall be conducted in ac-
cordance with the rules of equity procedure except that there shall be a jury trial
in such action or suit unless waived by the public official or employee involved.
Section 4. Jurisdiction of legislature. This Amendment shall have no effect
on the existing jurisdiction of the state Legislature to impeach and convict any
public official or employee.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor. The
jurisdiction of the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, established by
Constitutional Amendments I, II, and III and appropriate legislation pertaining
thereto, shall not be affected by any impeachment or conviction action or de-
cision of the state legislature.
APPENDIX B
Model Act for the Control of
Corruption and Conflicts of Interest
Short Title
Section 1. This Act shall be known, and may be cited, as the Standards
of Official Conduct Act.
Statement of Purposes, General Rules of
Construction, Severability, and Supremacy of Act
Section 2. (a) Purposes. The purposes of this Act are to foster needed and
important public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of government, to
require the loyal performance of official duties by all public servants, and to
protect the public by establishing high standards of conduct and efficient mech-
amsms for the control and punishment of any public official or employee violat-
ing any provision of this Act.
(b) Construction. (1) This Act shall be liberally construed to promote its
purposes and policies.
(2) No part of this Act shall be deemed to have been repealed by sub-
sequent legislation unless such legislation does so expressly.
(c) Severability. The provisions of this Act are severable, and if any
provision or its application is held unconstitutional or invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the unconstitutionality or invalidity shall not affect
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other provisions or applications of this Act which can be given effect without
the unconstitutional or invalid provision or application.
(d) Supremacy of Act. Since the purposes of this Act are matters of state-
wide concern, the provisions of this Act shall be controlling regardless of any
other law, including general, special, or local laws, to the contrary.
Definitions
Section 3. (a) Definitions. As used in this Act:
(1) "Action" or "proposed action" means any legislative, administrative,
appointive, or discretionary act of any public official or employee of the state
or any county or municipal government.
(2) "Business" means a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or
any other organization or association conducting activities for profit or economic
gain.
(3) "Compensation" means any benefit of an economic nature given for
services rendered.
(4) "Confidential information" means information which by law or
practice is not available to the public.
(5) "Contract" means any express or implied agreement with the state
or any county or municipal government.
(6) "Employment" means any rendering of services for compensation.
(7) "Financial interest" means an interest held by an individual, by such
individual's spouse, or by any minor children for whom such individual or such
individual's spouse is a parent or legal guardian which is:
(A) The interest of a trustee in a trust; or
(B) The interest of a beneficiary or cestui que trust in a trust; or
(C) The interest of a trustor or settlor in a revocable trust; or
(D) An ownership interest in a business; or
(E) A creditor interest in an insolvent business; or
(F) An employment or prospective employment for which formal or in-
formal negotiations have begun.
(8) "Gift" means any favor or economic benefit, other than compensation,
that a reasonable person would expect to cultivate goodwill in the donee toward
the donor.
(9) "Interest, any" (i.e., "any interest") means any direct or indirect
personal, pecuniary, material, or sentimental benefit, unless expressly excluded
by any provision of this Act, accruing to a public official or employee as a result
of a contract or transaction which is or may be the subject of an official action
or proposed action by or with the state or any county or municipal government.
(10) "Municipal government" means any city, town, village, or other
political subdivision of the state (except a county); any school district; any
public school, college, or university; any special district; any public authority or
commission; or any public corporation or agency exercising governmental
powers under state law.
(11) "Public official or employee" means any elected, appointed, nomi-
nated, or employed person, except a special employee, serving the state or any
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county or municipal government, whether paid or unpaid for such services.
(12) "Transaction" means the conducting of any activity which results in
or may result in action or proposed action by the state, county, or municipal
government.
Violation a Felony, Type of Sentence, Attorney General
and Special Prosecutor Jurisdiction and Duties,
Court Jurisdiction and Appeals, Advisory Opinions,
and Citizen Complaints
Section 4. (a) Violation a felony; type of sentence. (1) Violation of any
criminal provision of this Act shall constitute a felony.
(2) Sentencing for the violation of any criminal provision of this Act shall
be as follows:
(A) Unless the person convicted of violating any of the criminal provisions
of this Act presents a danger to himself or to others, such person shall be re-
quired, throughout the entire sentence term, to perform without compensation, in
any branch of state, county, or municipal government, whatever services the
sentencing judge believes will most effectively utilize such person's abilities and
experience and which reasonably approximate such person's official duties at the
time of the violation if such person was a public official or employee at the time
of the violation. All off-duty hours must be spent in confinement at the state
penitentiary or a jail or prison located near the area in which the convicted
person performs the free services.
(B) If the person convicted of violating any of the criminal provisions of
this Act does not qualify for the treatment imposed by subsection (a) (2) (A) of
this section, such person shall be sentenced in accordance with ordinary pro-
cedures applicable to such persons.
(b) Attorney General and Special Prosecutor's jurisdiction and duties.
(1) The state Attorney General shall have sole jurisdiction, except as noted in
subsection (b) (2) of this section, of state civil actions and suits and criminal
actions instituted for any violation of the provisions of this Act.
(2) The Governor shall appoint a Special Prosecutor who shall remain
independent of the state Attorney General and who shall have sole jurisdiction
of state civil actions and suits and criminal actions instituted for any violation
of the provisions of this Act committed by the state Attorney General or any
public official or employee who performs any duties within the authority and
responsibility of the state Attorney General. The Governor shall make such
appointment when he concludes that there exists probable cause to believe that
the state Attorney General or any public official or employee who performs any
duties within the authority and responsibility of the state Attorney General has
violated any provision of this Act.
(c) Court jurisdiction and appeals. The court jurisdiction of any state-
instituted civil action or suit or criminal action commenced for a violation of
any provision of this Act shall be as follows:
(1) For proceedings involving the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney
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General, Treasurer, Secretary of State, any Justice of the state Supreme Court,
any state Senator, and any state Representative, there is hereby created a Public
Ethics Court, composed of the Chief Justice or one Associate Justice of the
state Supreme Court specially designated before each such trial by the Chief
Justice of the state Supreme Court for the conduct of such trial. Any Justice
shall be ineligible for such appointment if he is a defendant or similarly involved
in subject trial. The most senior Associate Justice not a defendant or similarly
involved in such trial shall make the appointment if the Chief Justice is a
defendant or similarly involved in subject trial. This court shall have all the
powers of a circuit court. The Public Ethics Court shall be convened upon
petition of the state Attorney General or a special Prosecutor.
(2) For proceedings involving public officials and employees other than
those enumerated in subsection (c)( 1 ) of this section, the circuit court having
jurisdiction of the geographic area in which the alleged violation occurred shall
have jurisdiction. The Chief Judge of said circuit court, or a judge of such
circuit court specially designated before each such trial by the Chief Judge, shall
conduct the trial. Any judge who is a defendant or similarly involved in sub-
ject trial shall be ineligible to conduct subject trial. The most senior trial judge
of the circuit court having jurisdiction who is not a defendant or similarly in-
volved in subject trial shall make the appointment if the Chief Judge is a de-
fendant or similarly involved in subject trial. This court shall have all the powers
of a circuit court. This court shall be convened upon the petition of the state
Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor.
(3) A person described in subsections (c) (1) and (c) (2) of this section
shall be tried by a panel of twelve jurors unless such person waives a jury trial.
A jury verdict shall be rendered when any ten jurors are in agreement.
(4) All verdicts, impositions, decrees, or judgments involving persons
enumerated in subsections (c) (1) and (c) (2) of this section may be appealed
directly to the state Supreme Court by such involved persons or by the Attorney
General or a Special Prosecutor having jurisdiction of the case, as may final
rulings of the trial judge. Any judge or justice who was involved in the actual
conduct of the trial or who was a defendant or who was similarly involved in
the trial is ineligible for participation in the appellate decision and shall be re-
placed, if he or she is an associate justice or Chief Justice of the state Supreme
Court, by the most senior Chief Judge of circuit court jurisdiction who was not
involved in the conduct of the trial and who was not a defendant or similarly
involved in the trial.
(d) Advisory opinions of Attorney General. (1) On the request of any
person subject to the provisions of this Act, except those persons included in
subsection (e) of this section, for interpretations of this Act, the state Attorney
General shall issue advisory opinions stating the reasons for the conclusions
reached. These advisory opinions shall be made public, but the identity of the
requesting party and other matters necessary to maintain confidentiality shall be
deleted from the public record.
(2) Within thirty days of the receipt of a request for an advisory opinion,
the Attorney General shall issue an opinion. The failure to issue an opinion
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within thirty days shall imply that the submitted facts are not violative of this
Act. A statement of the submitted facts in such cases shall be published in ac-
cordance with the publication requirements of subsection (d) (1) of this section.
(3) An opinion that no violation is perceived shall not preclude sub-
sequent criminal prosecution or a civil action or suit by the state Attorney Gen-
eral under this Act if the actual transaction differs materially from the facts
submitted in the request for an advisory opinion.
(4) The receipt of an advisory opinion that proposed conduct will not
violate this Act shall constitute a complete defense to any subsequent criminal
action or civil action or suit instituted by the state Attorney General under this
Act if:
(A) the statement of facts submitted with the request for an advisory
opinion contained no material omission or misstatement; and
(B) the actual conduct did not vary materially from the facts submitted in
the request for an advisory opinion; and
(C) the advisory opinion was issued in response to prospective conduct; and
(D) the party requesting the opinion acted in good faith in relying upon
the advisory opinion.
(5) A defense to a criminal or civil action or suit instituted by the state
Attorney General under this Act which is based on subsection (d) (4) of this
section shall remain complete although a court later holds erroneous any
determination of law upon which the advisory opinion was based.
(6) The state Attorney General may subsequently amend or revoke an
advisory opinion he has issued, but such amendment or revocation shall have
prospective application only.
(e) Advisory opinions of A Special Prosecutor. (1) On the request of the
state Attorney General or any public official or employee who performs any
duties within the authority and responsibility of the state Attorney General for
interpretations of this Act, the Governor shall appoint within ten days of such
request a Special Prosecutor independent of the Attorney General who shall
issue an advisory opinion stating the reasons for the conclusions reached. These
advisory opinions shall be made public, but the identity of the requesting party
and other matters necessary to maintain confidentiality shall be deleted from
the public record.
(2) Within thirty days of the receipt by the Governor of a request for an
advisory opinion, the Special Prosecutor shall issue an opinion. The failure to
issue an opinion within thirty days shall imply that the submitted facts are not
violative of this Act. A statement of the submitted facts in such cases shall be
published in accordance with the publication requirements of subsection (e) (1)
of this section.
(3) An opinion that no violation is perceived shall not preclude subsequent
criminal prosecution or civil action or suit by a Special Prosecutor under this
Act if the actual transaction differs materially from the facts submitted in the
request for an advisory opinion.
(4) The receipt of an advisory opinion that proposed conduct will not
violate this Act shall constitute a complete defense to any subsequent criminal
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prosecution or civil action or suit instituted by a Special Prosecutor under this
Act if:
(A) the statement of facts submitted with the request for an advisory opin-
ion contained no material omission or misstatement; and
(B) the actual conduct did not vary materially from the facts submitted
in the request for an advisory opinion; and
(C) the advisory opinion was issued in response to prospective conduct;
and
(D) the party requesting the opinion acted in good faith in relying upon
the advisory opinion.
(5) A defense to a criminal or civil action or suit instituted by a Special
Prosecutor under this Act which is based on subsection (e) (4) of this section
shall remain complete although a court later holds erroneous any determination
of law upon which the advisory opinion was based.
(6) The Attorney General may subsequently amend or revoke an advisory
opinion issued by a Special Prosecutor, but such amendment or revocation shall
have prospective application only.
(f) Private party complaints. Any person may file a complaint, on a form
provided by the state Attorney General, alleging a specific violation or violations
of this Act and any resultant damages which such complainant may have suf-
fered. If the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate,
does not thereafter institute a criminal prosecution or civil action or suit under
this Act, based on the specific violation or violations alleged in the complaint,
within ninety days of the receipt of a properly filed complaint, the Attorney
General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, shall make public his reasons
therefor. The identity of the public official or employee and other items neces-
sary to maintain his or her anonymity shall be deleted from the public record.
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Section 5. (a) Procedure. (1) Any person injured by any wrongful action
or suit instituted by the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor may
recover actual damages from this state.
(2) Such damages shall be first alleged in a claim filed with the state
Attorney General on a form provided by the Attorney General in accordance
with the state Tort Claims Act.
(3) If a claim is disallowed, in total or in part, or if the state Attorney
General fails to issue a decision within 180 days of the receipt of a properly
filed claim, the damages not allowed may be filed as a civil damages action in
any circuit court of this state.
(4) The claim involved in subsection (a) (2) of this section and the civil
action involved in subsection (a) (3) of this section shall require proof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, of the institution of an action or suit by the
state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor motivated by malice and without
probable cause.
(b) Waiver of sovereign immunity. This section expressly waives sovereign
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immunity and supplements the state Tort Claims Act.
Persons Required to File Statements of
Economic Interests, Offices of Filing,
Filing Dates, and Public Access to Filed Statements
Section 6. (a) Persons required to file statements with state Attorney
General. The following persons, except those also included in subsection (b)
of this section, who shall then be governed solely by subsection (b) of this section,
shall file verified statements of economic interests, providing the information
required by section 8 of this Act, with the state Attorney General:
(1) every elected official, including United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives from this state and candidates for elective offices, but excluding the
President and Vice President and candidates for such offices;
(2) persons holding office as a Regent on the Board of Regents of the state
college or university system;
(3) persons holding effective appointments to any office or position, except
that of employee, in any branch of state, county, or municipal government of
this state;
(4) persons in the process of being appointed to any office or position
specified in subsection (a) (3) of this section and whose appointments have not
yet become effective;
(5) persons, including those whose primary duties involve teaching, who
are compensated for services to the state government and any county or muni-
cipal government as employees and not as independent contractors at an annual
rate exceeding $15,000 and other persons so employed who are compensated at
an annual rate of less than $15,000 if they receive fees for professional services
rendered the state, and any and all county governments and any and all munic-
ipal governments of this state such that their total income from public em-
ployment in this state, including all such professional fees, exceeds $15,000
annually.
(b) Persons required to file statements with Governor; Governor's duties.
(1) The state Attorney General and all public officials and employees who
perform any duties within the authority and responsibility of the state Attorney
General and whose total annual compensation for services rendered the state
government and any and all county and municipal governments exceeds $15,000
shall file with the Governor a verified statement of economic interests providing
the information required by section 8 of this Act.
(2) The Governor shall appoint a Special Prosecutor who shall remain
independent of the state Attorney General and who shall have sole jurisdiction of
any state civil action or suit or criminal action against any person included in
subsection (b) (1) of this section when the Governor concludes that there exists
probable cause to believe that such person has violated any of the provisions of
sections 6, 7, or 8 of this Act.
(e) Due dates. All persons listed in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
who are required to file statements of economic interests providing the informa-
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tion required by section 8 of this Act must file such statements at least an-
nually in the appropriate office on or before January 31st of the year following
the calendar year covered by the statement of economic interests.
(d) Special statements of economic interests required of candidates and ap-
pointees; due dates. (1) Every candidate for elective office, except those excluded
in subsection (a) (1) of this section, and all persons in the process of being ap-
pointed to any office or position, except that of employee, in any branch of state,
country or municipal government of this state shall file a special and complete
statement of economic interests reflecting the interests required to be disclosed
by section 8 of this Act and the status of the interests specified in subsections
(b) (1), (b) (2), (b) (3), (b) (6), (b) (11), (b) (12), and (b) (13) of section
8 of this Act on a date not more than fifteen days prior to the date of filing,
which must occur within the period stated in subsection (d) (2) of this section.
(2) The filing period for persons listed in subsection (d) (1) of this section
shall be the period forty-five to thirty days prior to:
(A) the election date if a candidate for elective office;
(B) the confirmation hearing date if an appointee whose appointment is
subject to confirmation by the state Senate;
(C) the effective date of the appointment if an appointee whose appoint-
ment is not subject to confirmation by the state Senate.
(3) All special statements of economic interests required by subsections
(d) (1) and (d) (2) of this section shall be filed in the appropriate office listed in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Each elective candidate or appointee to
an office included in subsection (a) of this section shall file a special statement of
economic interests with the state Attorney General. Each elective candidate or
appointee to an office included in subsection (b) of this section shall file a special
statement of economic interests with the Governor.
(e) Public access to filed statements of economic interests. (1) All state-
ments of economic interests shall be made available for public inspection at all
reasonable times in the office where filed.
(2) Facilities for copying all statements of economic interests shall be made
available at a reasonable cost in the offices where the statements are filed.
Filing a False Statement of Economic Interests
and Late Filing of a Statement of Economic Interests
Section 7. (a) Filing a false statement of economic interests. Any person
who files any materially false statement of economic interests is guilty of a felony
and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 4(a) (2) of
this Act, to a term of not more than five years.
(b) Late filing of a statement of economic interests. Any person who files
in the appropriate office a complete statement of economic interests providing the
information required by section 8 of this Act, or the information required by
section 6(d)(1) of this Act if such person is listed in section 6(d)(1) of this
Act, within twenty days after the required due date shall be subject to a civil
forefeiture of $100 for each day the required statement of economic interests is
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not filed. After the expiration of said twenty-day period, the lack of filing shall
be deemed a refusal or failure to file and shall be governed by section 8(c) of
this Act and by Constitutional Amendment II, but the accumulated civil
forfeiture shall remain in effect unless the privilege against self-incrimination is
invoked properly.
Control and Constructive Control, Interests Required
to Be Listed in the Statement of Economic Interests,
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Immunity
and Civil Actions or Suits
Section 8. (a) Control and constructive control. The statement of eco-
nomic interests required by section 6 of this Act shall include the interests of
the persons required to file the statement, the interests of his or her spouse, and
the interests of any minor children for whom the person required to file the
statement or such person's spouse is a parent or legal guardian.
(b) Interests to be listed. The following interests shall be listed by all
persons required to file a statement of economic interests:
(1) occupation, employer, and business address; and
(2) each financial interest exceeding $3,000 in any one bank or savings and
loan association, including a savings account, and the cash surrender value of
insurance policies; and
(3) the identity and nature, but not the current market value, of any
financial interest, the current market value of which exceeds $3,000, in any
business conducting activities for profit or economic gain in this state; and
(4) the complete identity of any capital asset, including the legal descrip-
tion of real property, from which a capital gain in excess of $2,000 was realized
in the preceding calendar year; and
(5) the name and address of any source from which compensation in any
form was received during the preceding calendar year, except that only the
total compensation in any form received from all sources protected by any
privilege, including but not limited to that of the doctor and patient or attorney
and client, need be reported; and
(6) the name or other identification of any business or trust in which is
held any office, trusteeship, directorship, partnership interest, or financial interest
of ten percent or more; and
(7) the name of any other business or trust from which a business or trust
listed in subsection (b) (6) of this section has received compensation, in any
form, in excess of $500 during the preceding calendar year and the consideration
rendered for such compensation; and
(8) a legal description of all real property having an assessed valuation in
excess of $1,000 in which any financial interest or increased financial interest
was acquired during the preceding calendar year, the amount and nature of each
such financial interest, and the total consideration given in acquiring each such
financial interest; and
(9) a legal description of all real property having an assessed valuation in
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excess of $2,000 in which a financial interest was held during the preceding
calendar year and not included in subsection (b) (8) of this section; and
(10) a legal description of all real property having an assessed valuation
in excess of $3,000 in which any business or trust held a financial interest during
the preceding calendar year if any financial interest in such business or trust was
held during the preceding calendar year; and
(11) a legal description of all real property having an assessed valuation
in excess of $3,000 in which any business or trust holds a financial interest
if any financial interest in such business or trust is held; and
(12) the identity of any compensated lobbyist with whom any business is
maintained; and
(13) the name and address of each creditor to whom $500 or more is owed,
the repayment terms of each such debt, and the security given, if any, for each
such debt, except that the security given for purchases under conditional sales
contracts need not be disclosed.
(c) Privilege against self-incrimination. (1) Any person required to file a
statement of economic interests may, when appropriate, invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination and refuse to file a statement of economic interests or
refuse to disclose any interests required to be disclosed.
(2) Any other refusal to file a statement of economic interests or to disclose
any interests required to be disclosed shall subject an incumbent public official
or employee to removal from office or position or other civil actions or suits, but
no criminal actions may be instituted for such refusals. Candidates for elective
office and appointees shall be governed by Constitutional Amendment II upon
refusal to file a statement of economic interests or to disclose any interests re-
quired to be disclosed, the privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding.
(3) Evidence of criminal conduct provided in any filed statement of
economic interests shall constitute a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and may subject the discloser to criminal prosecution or to civil actions
or suits.
(4) Any information provided in a filed statement of economic interests
may be used in any subsequent civil action or suit or criminal action instituted
by the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, against the
discloser. Such information may also be used by a private party in a private
action for damages, authorized by this Act, against the discloser.
(d) Immunity and civil actions and suits. (1) Any person required to file
a statement of economic interests may be granted immunity from use and
derivative use in any subsequent criminal proceeding of any compelled, self-
incriminating testimony, including disclosures provided in filed statements of
economic interests. Such immunity shall supplant the privilege against self-
incrimination.
(2) Any person receiving a grant of immunity specified in subsection
(d) (1) of this section shall file a complete statement of economic interests
disclosing all the information required. Such person shall be subject to any civil
action or suit authorized by this Act.
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Interest in Governmental Contracts
Section 9. (a) Procedure. If any public official or employee has any
interest, including but not limited to those of a personal, pecuniary, or senti-
mental nature, in any contract, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, which is being considered by any branch, agency, or department of
state, county, or municipal government, such public official or employee:
(1) shall, as soon as practicable after learning, or upon the expiration of a
reasonable time after he should have known by the exercise of ordinary care,
that a contract in which he has an interest is the subject of consideration by
any branch, agency, or department of state, county, or municipal government,
disclose the fact of such interest to the entity considering the contract; and
(2) shall not influence or attempt to influence any vote, or himself vote on
or participate in the award of the contract; and
(3) shall execute, after the contract has been awarded, a certificate that
he has complied with all the requirements of subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) of
this section.
(b) Exclusions. (1) Retail purchases under conditional sales contracts
and loans obtained from commercial lending institutions are excluded from the
provisions of this section if obtained in accordance with prevailing commercial
standards for like transactions in the city in which each such loan or retail
purchase occurred.
(2) Financial interests in privately owned public utility companies are
excluded from the provisions of this section.
(3) Financial interests in businesses which are the sole supplier of a good
or service are excluded from the provisions of this section. In making the sole
supplier determination, state government shall be confined to the geographical
boundaries of the state, each county shall be confined to its geographical boun-
daries, and each municipal government shall be confined to its geographical
or jurisdictional boundaries.
(c) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,
including the filing of a false certificate required by subsection (a) (3) of this
section, is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the
provisions of section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than seven years.
Interest in Governmental Transactions
Section 10. (a) Procedure. If any public official or employee has any
interest, including but not limited to those of a personal, pecuniary, or senti-
mental nature, in any action or proposed action of any branch, agency, or
department of state, county, or municipal government not included in subsection
(a) of section 9 of this Act and not excluded by subsections (b) (1) or (b) (2)
of this section, such public official or employee:
(1) shall, as soon as practicable after learning, or upon the expiration of
a reasonable time after he should have known by the exercise of ordinary care,
that any governmental action in which he has an interest is the subject of con-
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sideration by any branch, agency, or department of state, county, or municipal
government, disclose the fact of such interest to the entity considering the action
or proposed action; and
(2) shall not influence or attempt to influence any vote, or himself vote on
or participate in any decision involving the action or proposed action; and
(3) shall execute, after the decision on the action or proposed action has
been made, a certificate that he has complied with all the requirements of sub-
sections (a) (1) and (a) (2) of this section.
(b) Exclusions. (1) Any elected public official of the legislative branch of
state, county, or municipal government, when introducing or voting upon any
bill, measure, ordinance, or resolution, is excluded from the provisions of this
section.
(2) Retail purchases under conditional sales contracts and loans obtained
from commercial lending institutions are excluded from the provisions of this
section, if obtained in accordance with prevailing commercial standards for like
transactions in the city in which each such loan or retail purchase occurred.
(c) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section,
including the filing of a false certificate required by subsection (a) (3) of this
section, is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the
provisions of section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than seven years.
Confidential Information
Section 11. (a) Use for private gain. (1) No public official or employee
shall use confidential information acquired as a result of holding any position
in any branch of state, county, or municipal government for the private benefit
of such official or employee or any other person, business, or other entity.
(2) The prohibition on the use of confidential government information
specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section shall continue until such informa-
tion is made available to the general public by a properly authorized public
official or employee.
(b) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section is
guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of
section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than seven years.
Assisting in Transactions
Involving a Governmental Body
Section 12. (a) Representation or assistance prohibited. (1) No public
official or employee shall receive or agree to receive compensation in any form
for representing or assisting any person, business, or other entity in any transac-
tion involving any branch of state, county, or municipal government.
(2) The provisions of subsection (a) ( 1 ) of this section apply to the partners
of any public official or employee.
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(3) No public official or employee shall represent or assist any business or
other entity in any transaction involving any branch of state, county, or muni-
cipal government if he holds any financial interest in such business or entity.
(4) No partner of any public official or employee shall represent or assist
any business or other entity in any transaction involving any branch of state,
county, or municipal government if either such partner or the public official or
employee holds any financial interest in such entity or business.
(5) No public official or employee, nor any partner of a public official or
employee, shall represent any interest of such public official or employee or any
interest of a partner of such public official or employee in a transaction involving
any branch of state, county, or municipal government in any appearance before,
or filing of any legal documents with, any branch of state, county, or municipal
government.
(b) Exclusion. The provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply
to representation before any court.
(c) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section is
guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of
section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than seven years.
Bribery
Section 13. (a) Compensation for official action. No public official or
employee shall accept or agree to accept compensation in any form, other than
that provided by law, for the performance or nonperformance of official actions.
(b) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section is guilty
of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of section
4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than ten years.
Ex Parte Communications
Section 14. (a) Public record required. No public official or employee
shall encourage, make, or accept any ex parte or unilateral communication in
any form which is relevant to any determination to be made after a public
hearing without making the contents of such communication a part of the record
of such public hearing.
(b) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section is
guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of
section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than three years.
Gifts
Section 15. (a) Receipt of gifts prohibited. No public official or employee
shall solicit or accept a present or future gift, favor, service, or anything of value
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from any person, business, or other entity under circumstances where the public
official or employee knows or should know by the exercise of ordinary care that
such gift, favor, service, or thing of value will, or might tend to, affect the
present or future performance of official duties by such donee public official or
employee.
(b) Exclusion. Any award presented in recognition of public service, which
is awarded publicly, is excluded from the provisions of this section.
(c) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
this section who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section
is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions
of section 4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than ten years.
Postemployment
Section 16. (a) Prohibited conduct. No person who has served as a public
official or employee of any branch, except the legislative branch, of state, county,
or municipal government shall, for a period of two years after the termination
of such public service or employment, appear before the branch of government
of state, county, or municipal government in which such public official or em-
ployee previously served or receive compensation in any form for any services
rendered on behalf of any person, business, or other entity regarding any case,
proceeding, application, or transaction in which such former public official or
employee personally participated during his period of public service or employ-
ment.
(b) Special provisions for legislative members. (1) No person who has
served as a member of the legislative branch of any unit of state, county, or
municipal government shall assist, except in court representation or the rendering
of legal advice, any person, business, or other entity with any matter that was
before the legislative body in which such former member served during such
member's service. This prohibition shall expire two years after the termination
of legislative service.
(2) No person who has served as a member of the legislative branch of any
unit of state, county, or municipal government shall, for compensation in any
form, engage in lobbying activities before the legislative branch in which such
former member served. This prohibition shall expire two years after the ter-
mination of the former member's legislative service.
(c) Violation a felony; sentence. Any person subject to the provisions of
subsections (a) or (b) of this section who violates such a subsection is guilty of a
felony and shall be sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of section
4(a) (2) of this Act, to a term of not more than five years.
Special Employees
Section 17. (a) Definition of special employee; effect. (1) A person
performing services for any branch of state, county, or municipal government is
a special employee if:
[April 19761
MODEL ACT- FOR CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
(A) such person is not an elected official; and
(B) such person has not been appointed to any public office or position by
the highest ranking executive officer of the state or any, county or municipal
government; and
(C) such person occupies a position which, because of its classification, by
the civil service commission having jurisdiction, or by the terms of the employ-
ment contract with such person, also allows private employment during normal
duty hours; or
(D) such person did not earn compensation in any form as a state, county,
or municipal government employee for a total of more than 100 days in the
preceding 365 days.
(2) A person who qualifies as a'special employee shall be subject to the
provisions of this Act only regarding matters for which such person has or had
direct responsibility as defined by the terms of such person's employment con-
tract or classification by the civil service commission having jurisdiction.
Constructive Trust, Private Party's Right to
Pro Rata Share, and Private.Party Actions
Section 18. (a) Constructive trust imposition. (1) The state Attorney
General or a Special Prosecutor appointed by the Governor, as specified in sec-
tion 4(b) (2) of this Act, is authorized to institute a civil action or suit to impose
a constructive trust upon all property, funds, and profits acquired by violation of
any of the provisions of this Act, and upon the products thereof in the possession
of whomever found, except when in the possession of a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice.
(2) The constructive trust action or suit autaorized m subsection (a) (1)
of this section shall be instituted against the public official or employee acquiring
property, funds, or profits by violation of any of the provisions of this Act, against
the property, funds, or profits, whether in original or altered form, and against
possessors of such property, funds, or profits, whether in original or altered form,
except bona fide purchasers for value without notice, in a court having jurisdic-
tion of such action or suit as specified. in section 4(c) of this Act.
(3) The tracing and recovery of such property, funds, or profits shall be
in' accordance with established principles of equity governing the imposition of
a constructive trust.
(4) The final imposition of a constructive trust shall result in the auto-
matic removal from office or position of any public official, or employee whose
violation of any of the provisions of this Act was the basis for the imposition of
said constructive trust.
(b) Private party's-right to pro rata share; private party actions. (1) After
final imposition of a constructive trust, as specified in the provisions of subsection
(a) of this section, the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, ,as ap-
propriate, who had jurisdiction of the action or suit to impose the constructive
trust shall hold the recovered property, funds, or profits subject to the claims of
innocent third parties damaged by the conduct which provided the basis for
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imposition of the constructive trust.
(2) Within ten days after final imposition of the constructive trust, and for
a period of 60 days thereafter, the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor,
as appropriate, who had jurisdiction of the action or suit to impose the con-
structive trust, shall cause to be published in the official state newspaper a notice
inviting submission of damage claims, on forms specially provided for such
purpose by the state Attorney General, by innocent third parties suffering dam-
age from the conduct which provided the basis for imposition of the constructive
trust.
(3) Within 60 days after the expiration of the 60-day period specified in
subsection (b) (2) of this section, the state Attorney General or a Special Pros-
ecutor, as appropriate, who had jurisdiction of the imposition of the construc-
tive trust shall determine the validity of each private party claim, including the
amount of each such claim, and shall either disallow a claim in its entirety if
found invalid or allow either what is deemed to represent actual damages if the
claim is found to be valid but excessive or allow the total amount of the claim
if found valid and not excessive.
(4) If the claim is allowed, either in total or in part, the award to each
claimant shall be the total amount allowed if the aggregate of allowed claims
does not exceed the total recovery of the state Attorney General or a Special
Prosecutor, as appropriate, who had jurisdiction of the imposition of the con-
structive trust. Any excess recovery shall be transferred to the General Fund of
the state, county, or municipal government served by the public official or em-
ployee whose violation of any of the provisions of this Act provided the basis for
the imposition of the constructive trust.
(5) If the aggregate of allowed claims exceeds the total recovery by the
state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, who had juris-
diction of the imposition of the constructive trust, each award shall be based on
the percentage which the respective allowed amount represents of the total
allowed claims multiplied by the total recovery of the state Attorney General or
a Special Prosecutor.
(6) There shall be no right of appeal regarding the disallowance of any
claim or any award made by the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor,
as appropriate, who had jurisdiction of the imposition of the constructive trust.
(7) No party other than one of those specified in subsection (a) (1) of this
section shall have standing to institute a civil action or suit to impose a construc-
tive trust upon property, funds, or profits acquired by violation of any of the
provisions of this Act.
(8) If a constructive trust has been imposed in accordance with subsection
(a) of this section for the same conduct causing damage to a private party,
each such private party damaged by such conduct whose claim for damages has
been disallowed by the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as ap-
propriate, who had jurisdiction of the imposition of the constructive trust or
whose award is less than the amount sought in a claim properly filed with the
state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, who had jurisdic-
tion of the imposition of the constructive trust, may file, in a court having juris-
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diction of similar damage actions, a private action for damages in an amount
representing the excess of the amount claimed over the award received against
the public official or employee who has committed conduct violative of any
provision of this Act, such conduct having provided the basis for imposition of the
constructive trust. The only issue for determination in such private damage
action is the amount of actual damages suffered by the private party plaintiff
as a result of the conduct of the public official or employee which provided the
basis for imposition of the constructive trust.
(9) In addition to the provisions of subsection (b) (8) of this section, the
following provisions shall govern the institution of private party damage actions
against public officials and employees violating any of the provisions of this Act:
(A) If no constructive trust has been imposed in accordance with the pro-
visions of subsection (a) of this section for the same conduct causing damage
to a private party, no private party damaged by such conduct may institute a
civil action to recover damages from a public official or employee suffered as the
result of such conduct without first filing a complaint alleging damages suffered
in accordance with the provisions of section 4(f) of this Act. If the state At-
tomey General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, then refuses to institute
any criminal action or civil action or suit, in accordance with the provisions of
section 4(f) of this Act, such private party may institute a civil action for
damages against the public official or employee; but if the state Attorney General
or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, within the period specified in section 4 (f)
of this Act, institutes or has instituted any criminal action or civil action or suit,
other than a civil action or suit to impose a constructive trust, no private party
may institute a private action to recover damages, based on the same conduct in-
cluded in the criminal action or civil action or suit instituted by the state Attorney
General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate, against the public official or em-
ployee without first requesting and receiving permission to institute such an
action, in writing, from the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as
appropriate, who has jurisdiction of the case.
(B) If the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate,
in response to a citizen complaint institutes within the period specified in section
4(f) of this Act or has instituted a civil action or suit to impose a constructive
trust upon the property, funds, or profits acquired as the result of violation of
any of the provisions of this Act by a public official or employee, each private
party damaged by the same conduct is limited to the remedies in subsections
(b) (1) through (b) (8) of this section.
(C) If the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor, as appropriate,
is unsuccessful in any criminal action or civil action or suit, no private action
for damages may be instituted against the same public official or employee for
the same conduct which formed the basis for the criminal action or civil action




Voidability of Government Contracts and
Transactions and Private Party Standing
Section 19. (a) Voidability of contracts and transactions. (1) The state
Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor appointed by the Governor, as specified
in section 4(b) (2) of this Act, is authorized to institute a civil action or suit seek-
ing a declaration or decree, on behalf of the state or any county or municipal
government, that a contract or transaction entered into, performed, or agreed to
by the state or such county or municipal government is void because such
contract or transaction was influenced or effected by conduct of a public official
or employee of the state or of a county or municipal government which is or was
in violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
(2) The civil action or suit specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section
shall be instituted in the court having jurisdiction as specified in section 4(c) of
this Act.
(b) Standing to institute suit. No person other than one of those specified
in subsection (a) (1) of this section shall have standing to institute an action
or suit seeking a declaration or decree that any state, county, or municipal gov-
ermnent contract or transaction is void.
Multiple Actions and Suits by State Attorney
General or a Special Prosecutor
Section 20. The institution by the state Attorney General or a Special
Prosecutor, as appropriate, of any suit or action authorized by this Act shall not
preclude the institution by the state Attorney General or a Special Prosecutor,
as appropriate, of any other suit or action authorized by this Act which is based
on the same or another violation of any provision of this Act, except that sub-
sequent actions or suits shall be subject to the principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel.
Immunity from Prosecution and
Its Effect on Civil Actions and Suits
Section 21. (a) Immunity from criminal prosecution. Any person subject
to the provisions of this Act may be granted immunity from the use and
derivative use of any compelled, self-incriminating testimony, including a filed
statement of economic interests, in a subsequent criminal prosecution for viola-
tion of any provision of this Act.
(b) Civil actions or suits. Any person receiving a grant of immunity
specified in subsection (a) of this section shall remain subject to any civil action
or suit authorized by this Act.
Repealer
Section 22. Other state laws and parts of laws in conflict with the pro-
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visions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Effective Date
Section 23. This Act shall be effective 90 days after its passage by the state
legislature.
